Peace Diplomacy-2025: Ukrainian "aikido" in negotiations and "karate" in the security sphere
On past miscalculations and the real levers available to Ukraine on the path to peace
This year has become a period of complex political balancing for Ukraine. The peace process keeps going, the number of negotiating platforms has increased, yet a breakthrough toward ending the war has yet to be reached.
In a video address on the occasion of Diplomatic Service Day, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha noted that Ukrainian diplomacy has demonstrated the ability, under the most difficult circumstances, to keep its back straight, its head cool, and its principles unshakable.
“But as long as this war is grinding on, our work is not enough. That is why we’ve set a high bar for ourselves: to work with even greater dedication, to achieve even more, to be a force. This year our motto is ‘From the power of diplomacy to the diplomacy of power,’” the minister emphasized.
Ukrinform spoke with diplomats and experts to find out what hindered the implementation of peace initiatives in the past and what lessons for the future should be drawn.
PROACTIVITY WITHOUT RESULTS
President Volodymyr Zelensky, for the first time ever, outlined Ukraine’s vision of a just peace during an online address at the G20 summit in Bali in mid-November 2022. It was about the ten-point Peace Formula. By that time, Ukraine had already liberated the Kharkiv region and Kherson city, so promoting its own approach to ending the war looked logical and natural.
Throughout 2023 and until mid-June 2024, intensive diplomatic work with partners continued with the aim of coordinating the principles of a peace process that would ensure a lasting peace. It culminated in the first Peace Summit held in Bürgenstock, Switzerland.
According to expectations from the Ukrainian side, this event was supposed to strengthen Ukraine’s position on the international stage and make it harder for Russia to promote its own initiatives. As a result, delegations from more than 90 countries and several international organizations reaffirmed, in a joint communiqué, their commitment to the principles of peace, Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and international law. However, this did not lead to a breakthrough toward peace, and today even in Ukraine there is a tendency to avoid mentioning the Summit at all.
According to Oleh Shamshur, former Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States (2006–2010) and France (2014–2020), such an outcome of proactive efforts was predictable, as they created “illusions for which there were no real grounds.”
“In my view, these initiatives are the worst example of performative diplomacy, where the media effect, the ‘picture,’ matters more than substantive content,” he said in a comment to Ukrinform.
Shamshur also criticized what he described as a “buffet-style” approach used at the Summit, whereby participants engaged only with convenient and least sensitive topics, avoiding the key issues of countering Russian aggression.
“Overall, time and political capital were lost — both ours and that of our leading partners,” the former ambassador believes.
A similar view is shared by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Andrii Veselovskyi, adviser to the director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies. In a conversation with Ukrinform, he noted that in this case “a lot of energy was spent in not quite the right direction.”
He believes that, when waging an exhausting war against a stronger adversary, a government must not only seek support from external partners but also propose ways out of the situation that appear effective and convincing to them.
“From this perspective, the peace initiatives were not sufficiently well thought out and therefore did not achieve their intended goals,” Veselovskyi noted.
In this context, he pointed out that the broad pro-Ukrainian coalition — bringing together the EU countries, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others — already understood the situation well enough. Instead, systematic work was needed primarily with countries of the Global South.
“That is where Ukrainian delegations should have traveled, explaining the true nature of the war and the colonial nature of Russia. And the large-scale foreign policy efforts aimed at promoting peace initiatives could have been used to build a genuine lobby in the United States, the absence of which is now felt especially acutely,” the diplomat emphasized.
20 POINTS OF THE PEACE PLAN VS. PUTIN’S “GOALS OF THE SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION”
After the Summit, the peace process largely boiled down to a series of international meetings and consultations on various peace plans and discussions of a ceasefire that ultimately never materialized.
A certain informational boost to this process was provided by statements from Donald Trump. Even before being elected president, he promised to end the Russo-Ukrainian war within 24 hours, later within 100 days, and finally within six months—yet he failed to meet any of his self-imposed deadlines. At the same time, the U.S. president continued, in various forms, to declare his willingness to end the war—both during meetings with President Volodymyr Zelensky and in contacts with Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin.
In November, an American 28-point peace plan leaked to the media, painfully reminiscent of Putin’s Istanbul “wish list” from April 2022. The convoluted story of its emergence looked as if it had been deliberately constructed to refute the words of Ukraine’s First Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsya that international politics is not a Netflix series.
Despite this, it was precisely this plan that triggered a new round of shuttle diplomacy between Ukraine and the United States—first in Geneva and Florida, later in Berlin, and, in a different configuration, in Moscow.
Former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba believes that the current contacts between Ukraine and the United States are the first genuine attempt to reach peace agreements since Donald Trump’s return to the White House.
“Before this, there was mostly talk, but now there is a real effort,” the diplomat noted.
Ukraine’s peace tactics in these negotiations can figuratively be described as “political aikido,” as their essence lies in defense without aggression, control of the situation, and a pursuit of balance.
However, according to Shamshur, given Putin’s extremely negative reaction to any attempts to make the terms of a peace plan more acceptable for Ukraine, reaching a compromise appears unlikely.
“We are in the process of improving something bad, but that does not make it any less bad. In the peace plan that currently forms the basis of negotiations, we effectively see the implementation of the ‘Anchorage spirit’: before obtaining a ceasefire, one must fulfill the full list of Putin’s wishes and demands without any concessions on his part,” the diplomat notes.
At the same time, he acknowledges that Ukraine’s room for maneuver is limited and that the negotiation process therefore has to continue, avoiding “sharp moves” and maintaining dialogue with the American side.
In the course of intensive consultations between Ukraine and the United States, the American peace plan was reduced from 28 to 20 points. According to media reports, some provisions were merged, while the most problematic issues—territories, Russia’s responsibility, and reparations—were postponed to later stages.
According to the latest updates from the negotiation track, during a meeting in the U.S.–Ukraine format, the parties worked through the 20-point plan, aligned their positions on a multilateral framework agreement on security guarantees and a bilateral agreement on security guarantees from the United States, and also continued work on an economic development plan (a prosperity plan).
Ahead of the meetings last weekend, the U.S. president stated that the negotiation process on ending the war “is getting close to something,” and that the Ukrainian side needs to hurry up so that the Russians “do not change their minds again.”
In the meanwhile, U.S. intelligence services continue to warn about Vladimir Putin’s intentions to seize all of Ukraine and reclaim parts of Europe that once belonged to the Soviet empire.
However, the true intentions of the Kremlin dictator are clear even without intelligence data—he voices them publicly himself. Most recently, during his annual press conference and call-in show on December 19, Putin once again emphasized that the war will continue until Russia achieves the “goals of the special military operation,” and until Ukraine accepts Russia’s demands.
Therefore, Donald Trump—who has himself stated that he trusts Putin more than U.S. intelligence—would do well to listen to the Kremlin leader’s statements less selectively than he does now.
STRIKE FIRST, “SUB SEA BABY”!
Diplomats and experts interviewed by Ukrinform unanimously support the continuation of the negotiation process, while at the same time emphasizing that diplomacy alone—even through the most groundbreaking initiatives—cannot bring the war to an end without a change in the situation on the battlefield.
The difficulty lies in the fact that Russian forces maintain constant offensive pressure along the entire along the entire front line, as evidenced by the General Staff’s daily reports. Yet even under these conditions, Ukraine’s Defense Forces are managing to provide the Ukrainian delegation with negotiating “trump cards.”
If Ukraine’s negotiating tactics can be metaphorically compared to aikido, then its precision strikes against Russian targets on land, on water, and underwater resemble karate: not a chaotic use of force, but precision, control, and targeted blows against the vulnerable points of a stronger opponent.
Examples of Ukraine’s “karate” in the security sphere over just the past week alone are truly striking.
On the night of December 15, in the port of Novorossiysk, Russia, underwater drones Sub Sea Baby operated by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) made history by destroying a Russian Project 636.3 Varshavyanka-class submarine for the first time ever.
On the same day, long-range drones of the SBU’s Alpha Special Operations Center struck oil production platforms operated by Lukoil-Nizhnevolzhskneft in the Caspian Sea for the third time in a single week.
Overnight on December 18, long-range unmanned aerial vehicles from the Alpha Special Operations Center of the Security Service of Ukraine successfully targeted components of Russia’s air defense system at the Belbek military airfield in currently occupied Crimea.
On December 19, the Security Service of Ukraine carried out another unprecedented special operation more than 2,000 kilometers from Ukrainian territory, striking the tanker QENDIL, part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” with aerial drones in the Mediterranean Sea.
In early hours of December 20, Ukraine’s Defense Forces successfully struck a Russian Project 22460 Okhotnik-class patrol ship and a drilling platform in the Caspian Sea.
On December 20, long-range drones operated by the Alpha Special Operations Center of the Security Service of Ukraine struck two Su-27 fighter jets at the Russian military airfield Belbek in currently occupied Crimea.
On the night of December 21, two Su-30 fighter jets caught fire at a Russian military airfield near Lipetsk. Both aircraft were disabled after being hit right inside their protective hangars.
Meanwhile, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit on December 12 to Kupiansk—a city that Russian forces have captured and lost at least twice—had, according to him, a significant impact on international partners, including the United States, and clearly exposed Vladimir Putin’s bluffing.
According to Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, at a time when Ukraine’s “oil sanctions” are being strengthened, military strikes are becoming increasingly painful, and the Russian economy is beginning to wobble, the moment has come to step up pressure on the Kremlin.
“The Group of Seven, the European Union, and the United States still have many different methods of influence available they can use in concert. Only 20% of Russia’s defense-industrial base is currently under sanctions… Russia’s energy revenues can and must be reduced even further. Together, we can definitely bring Russia’s war machine to a halt by cutting off its fuel flow. Let’s do it now,” the foreign minister urged.
However, among the so-called “willing,” resolve is unfortunately not always sufficient. For example, there was not enough determination among EU member states to support a reparations loan for Ukraine funded by frozen Russian assets, forcing the search for alternative solutions.
Meanwhile, Russia’s intimidation tactics often produce the opposite effect, leaving hope alive that pressure will intensify and that progress on the sanctions front will ultimately be achieved.
DRAWING LESSONS, NOT MULTIPLYING MISTAKES
In a situation where the peace process is ongoing and its end remains uncertain, even interim assessments are extremely difficult to make.
Nevertheless, when it comes to the diplomatic balance sheet, the formula “Russia is not winning, and Ukraine is not losing” appears quite appropriate.
In 2025, Russian diplomacy managed to impose its own framework of so-called “peace” proposals, drag out negotiations, keep channels of contact open, and push ahead with its narrative that it is ready for peace on its own terms—terms unacceptable to Ukraine. At the same time, it failed to force Ukraine into fundamental concessions, to secure the lifting of sanctions, or to deprive Ukraine of the support of its international partners.
Ukraine, for its part, came under significant pressure in 2025—primarily due to changes in the U.S. policy and complex political processes within EU countries. Nevertheless, it managed to preserve both financial and security support from its partners.
Indeed, this support is no longer as unequivocal and powerful as it once was, and this is only natural: the emotional wave of 2022–2023 has subsided and given way to pragmatic “solidarity based on calculation.” At the same time, internal debates in certain EU Member States—particularly regarding the possible return of compulsory military service—and the reactions of European societies to these debates provide grounds to expect that support for Ukraine will be maintained at least in the medium term.
As for achieving peace on terms acceptable to Ukraine, Ukrinform’s interlocutors emphasize the need for realism, a clear strategic vision, and prudence in making and implementing political decisions—especially in conditions of limited resources and a critical situation. Equally important, they note, is the ability to draw conclusions from past mistakes rather than multiply them.
According to Oleh Shamshur, for Ukraine’s actions to be effective—“not ad hoc, but well thought out”—changes are needed in the very process of making both domestic and foreign policy decisions.
“In my conviction, any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire are impossible until we and our partners manage to stop Putin. This would make it possible to talk to him, if not from a position of strength, then at least from strong positions,” the former ambassador said.
Andrii Veselovskyi generally agreed with his colleague, noting that Ukraine is critically in need of U.S. assistance; however, the American approach traditionally consists in supporting winners rather than “losers.”
“To a large extent, we looked like losers because of our own mistakes—corruption controversies, foreign-policy arrogance associated with specific individuals, and so on. That is why, in my view, it is a good thing that Serhii Kyslytsia and Pavlo Palisa have appeared in our negotiating team, because earlier we often lost precisely due to the unprofessionalism of the negotiators,” the diplomat noted.
Publicist Vitalii Portnykov considers the only realistic scenario for ending the war to be the exhaustion of the Russian state, under which the Putin regime will no longer be able to issue ultimatums either to Ukraine or to the West.
“Only then will the opportunity for real negotiations emerge. Until that time, the peace process will remain a kind of spinning top—whirling around but not moving forward,” he concluded.
Nadiya Yurchenko, Kyiv
Headline photo via the Office of the President