Zelensky’s Visit to Poland: Will Tensions Between Kyiv and Warsaw Ease?
Karol Nawrocki’s stance on Ukraine contrasts with that of all previous Polish leaders.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will visit Warsaw on Friday, December 19. This will be the third visit by the head of the Ukrainian state to Poland in 2025. The previous two took place earlier in the year: an official visit on January 15, and another on January 27 to mark the 80th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau.
The backdrop underlying the current visit is a certain cooling of bilateral relations and an acute domestic political confrontation in Poland between the president and the prime minister, which is also affecting Ukrainian–Polish relations.
What is currently happening in relations between Kyiv and Warsaw, and what outcomes could Zelensky’s Warsaw visit deliver?
A MEETING AFTER PROLONGED DISCUSSIONS OVER ITS VENUE
This will be the first face-to-face meeting between Zelensky and Karol Nawrocki, who officially assumed the presidency in early August. Although the date of the visit became known only recently, discussions about it had been ongoing for several months. According to an unwritten rule—though it is not absolute—the newly elected president usually makes the first visit to a neighboring country. After his election, Nawrocki has already paid visits to neighboring Lithuania, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. However, in the case of Ukraine, he and his entourage adopted a different stance. Despite an official invitation to visit Kyiv, the Polish presidential office stated that if Zelenskyy wished to meet Nawrocki, he should come to Warsaw himself.
Former Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski commented on the matter by saying that, were he in Nawrocki’s place, he would go to Kyiv, but he also noted that nothing bad would happen if Zelenskyy came to Warsaw. According to the former Polish leader, a dispute over this issue makes no sense at all.
The Ukrainian side decided not to get drawn into a lengthy discussion over the matter and agreed to the initiative of the Polish president’s chancellery to hold the visit in Warsaw.
Nawrocki’s entourage has outlined the issues the Polish leader wants to raise with his Ukrainian counterpart. These include, first and foremost, security, difficult historical issues in bilateral relations, as well as economic cooperation.
Nawrocki does not hide the fact that he has serious grievances toward the Ukrainian side and intends to discuss them with Zelensky. In the days leading to the Ukrainian President’s visit to Poland, he gave a major interview to Polish media in which, among other things, he emphasized that Warsaw does not agree to be a “junior partner” to Kyiv.
“As president, I cannot, do not want to, and will not agree to Poland being treated merely as a ‘vestibule’ or a ‘corridor’ in matters that are strategically important to us. We have our own expectations of Ukraine, just like any other country in the world,” Nawrocki emphasized in an interview with the online outlet Wirtualna Polska.
He stressed that partnership implies openness to the expectations of the other side, including on matters such as granting permits for search and exhumation work, taking Poland’s economic interests into account in bilateral relations, and involving Poland more broadly in international political and diplomatic processes aimed at achieving peace in Ukraine and ensuring security in the region.
It is worth noting that Nawrocki’s sharp rhetoric toward Ukraine often causes surprise even within Poland. In particular, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk— who is Nawrocki’s political opponent and whose relations are openly strained—reacted critically to this interview, including in the context of Ukraine.
In addition to talks with Nawrocki, the agenda for Zelensky’s December visit to Warsaw will include a meeting with Polish Prime Minister Tusk, as well as negotiations with the leadership of Poland’s Sejm and Senate.
For the Ukrainian side, it is critically important to maintain close and strong relations with Warsaw. Around 90% of all international aid to Ukraine passes through Poland; by its potential, it is a leader among Eastern European countries; its voice carries significant weight in NATO and the EU; and a large number of migrants and war refugees from Ukraine currently live in the country on the Vistula. Therefore, in relations with Poland’s leadership, particular attention will be focused primarily on security, the provision of further assistance to Ukraine, cooperation between the two countries’ defense industries, and the situation of Ukrainians in Poland.
WHAT HAS CHANGED UNDER NAWROCKI'S PRESIDENCY
The current president of Poland, frankly speaking, does not have any particular sympathies toward Ukraine. In this respect, he stands in stark contrast to all previous Polish leaders without exception, who consistently paid significant attention to relations with Kyiv and did not conceal their positive attitude toward Ukraine as an important neighbor and strategic partner.
Nawrocki has a different approach to relations with Ukraine, which he outlined already during the presidential election campaign.
He holds clearly right-conservative views and is very popular among that segment of Polish society that is skeptical toward Ukrainians and cooperation with Ukraine. Even before the presidential election, Nawrocki publicly pledged not to support Ukraine’s membership in NATO, was cautious about the prospect of Ukraine's European integration, and has also claimed that Ukrainians in Poland enjoy too many privileges. As a historian and former head of the Institute of National Remembrance, the current Polish president has repeatedly emphasized that thorny historical issues in bilateral relations are a priority for him, and that he will demand that Ukraine address a range of historical problems that are important and worrying to ordinary Poles.
Shortly after taking office, Nawrocki vetoed a law on assistance to war refugees from Ukraine, demanding that the benefits granted to them be abolished. After the government revised the law, the Polish president signed it on a second attempt, but declared that this was the last time he would do so.
The delay in determining the date and venue for the meeting with Zelensky, as well as the open criticism of Kyiv’s policies, are evidence that Nawrocki is fulfilling his campaign promises to his right-conservative electorate. In this context, it is unlikely that anything will change significantly in the near future.
Against this backdrop, the policy toward Ukraine pursued by the government led by Donald Tusk stands out somewhat. On fundamental issues, the ruling left-liberal coalition also takes a tough stance. For example, this includes the consistent extension—now for the third consecutive year—of the embargo on grain imports from Ukraine to Poland, as well as a righteous refusal to send a Polish peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine in the future.
However, overall contacts at the intergovernmental level are very productive. Tusk and ministers of his cabinet highlight the positive aspects of relations with Ukraine, including in the context of the difficult shared history.
In this context, it should be noted that Poland is experiencing intense domestic political confrontation along the president–government line, and Ukrainian issues often become a subject of these disputes. Thus, over the past few days there has been a political spat between the Council of Ministers and the presidential palace regarding plans to transfer MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine. The president’s office accused the government of allegedly not informing Nawrocki about the plans to hand over the aircraft to Ukraine. The Council of Ministers denies this, while at the same time reassuring Polish society that the aircraft being transferred are in fact the fighters decommissioned at the end of the year, which could otherwise have been “sold for scrap metal,” and that in return Poland plans to receive new technologies for the production of UAVs and missiles.
It is already obvious that, due to the views of the incumbent Polish president on contacts with Ukraine, the center of gravity in Kyiv–Warsaw relations will gradually shift from the presidential palace—where it had been for more than the past 30 years—to Poland’s Council of Ministers. However, this could all change again after the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2027, as right-conservative forces allied with outright nationalists—who hold much more radical views on cooperation with Ukraine than Nawrocki—have fairly strong chances of winning and forming a coalition.
ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING THE VISIT
Zelensky’s visit to Warsaw will take place against the backdrop of a noticeable deterioration in public sentiment in Polish society regarding further support for Ukraine and attitudes toward Ukrainians.
From the intense empathy and support for Ukraine that were evident in Poland in 2022 and the first half of 2023, little has left today, frankly speaking. And this is acknowledged by everyone—not only opponents, but also supporters of closer relations with Ukraine.
This has been influenced by both objective and subjective factors. The initial euphoria over helping Ukraine has over time gradually gave way to fatigue from protracted war, and consequently to fears about one’s own future security; annoyance and numerous phobias caused by the large number of Ukrainians in the cities of a country that until recently was almost entirely monoethnic; and disappointment with the dynamics of bilateral Polish-Ukrainian relations—an issue especially emphasized by Poland’s far right and by Russian propaganda, which has sharply intensified in Poland recently.
The deterioration in public sentiment was largely driven, in particular, by the so-called grain crisis and the related blockade of the shared border in late 2023 and early 2024, as well as by Ukraine’s inflexibility (in the view of part of the Polish elites) on granting permits for search and exhumation work and on resolving other difficult issues related to the shared history.
And over the past two years, another serious problem has emerged: through social media, Russian intelligence services have been able to recruit Ukrainian citizens (primarily young people and minors) to carry out acts of sabotage and subversion on Polish territory.
In just the past few months, 55 individuals acting in the interests of Russia’s intelligence services have been detained in Poland, most of them Ukrainian citizens. Ukrainian nationals—even those who had long lived in the occupied territories or in Russia—were also involved in the recent acts of sabotage on Poland’s railways.
Each new report about the involvement of people holding Ukrainian passports in acts of sabotage triggers a surge of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, which is further amplified by Russian information warfare campaigns.
In December alone, several high-profile incidents occurred involving assaults or hate speech against ordinary Ukrainians—for example, in Poznań and Gdynia.
And in Przemyśl there was an outright amusing yet telling situation: amid a wave of outrage from local residents and online hate, the city authorities were forced to “change the outfit” of a New Year’s teddy bear that had originally been dressed in blue and yellow. Despite the fact that blue and yellow are the colors of the city’s coat of arms, for many this was deemed an unacceptable gesture of the city’s “Ukrainization.”
According to this year’s survey conducted by the IBRiS polling center for the Stand with Ukraine foundation, in 2025—for the first time—the number of Poles who support Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO is lower than the number of those who oppose it (EU: 35% in favor, 42% against; NATO: 37% in favor, 42% against).
Against this backdrop, the dominance of anti-Ukrainian propaganda in the Polish segment of social media—especially on X—is also alarming. According to data from Demagog, a respected Polish organization that monitors disinformation, the number of anti-Ukrainian messages doubled between August and November from the previous comparable period.
The report emphasizes that such waves of propaganda coincide with the objectives of Russia’s information strategy, which aims to weaken partners’ support for Ukraine and undermine trust among allies. These disinformation and anti-Ukrainian campaigns involve numerous bot farms, but a significant number of real people are also participating.
The Polish authorities see the problem of the sharp rise in anti-Ukrainian hate—increasingly provoked from outside the country—and are trying to implement countermeasures. These include awareness-raising efforts at multiple levels to explain that Ukraine is neither an enemy nor a threat to Poland, and that the real danger to the country comes from Russia.
WHAT'S NEXT FOR THE RELATIONS?
Despite the fairly unfavorable information background and the prevalence of anti-Ukrainian propaganda, it is worth emphasizing that, overall, the Polish authorities—both the president and the government—continue to support Ukraine in its fight against the Russian aggressor, stressing that an independent and strong Ukraine is a guarantee of Poland’s security. Warsaw will continue, at least until the next parliamentary elections in 2027, to provide Kyiv with political, diplomatic, military, and humanitarian assistance. At the same time, Poland expects Ukraine to take its interests into account: a meaningful place at the negotiating table on Ukraine’s future, a favorable environment for Polish businesses in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction effort, and the resolution of shared historical issues in bilateral relations.
Overall, Zelensky’s December visit to Warsaw is, above all else, a good opportunity to establish a constructive dialogue at the level of heads of state, which until now has been largely absent. At the same time, it will be a favorable moment—against the backdrop of noticeable anti-Ukrainian sentiment—to demonstrate how important and promising cooperation between the two countries is at the intergovernmental level and across all other levels as well. And in this area, there are tangible achievements. In particular, this year has seen a significant intensification of historical dialogue: search and exhumation work has been carried out in both Ukraine and Poland, and the two sides have recently agreed to continue intensive cooperation into 2026.
An important element is also the intensification of military cooperation and collaboration in the defense industrial sector, which is already underway. Ukraine has an interest in collaborative production and procurement of weapons and ammunition, as well as in the reliable functioning of the Rzeszów–Jasionka hub. Poland, in turn, is interested in gaining Ukraine’s invaluable experience in countering hostile UAVs, civil protection, and cutting-edge technologies.
Economic and cross-border cooperation are also essential components to bilateral relations. Poland is very eager to play an active role in Ukraine’s postwar recovery and reconstruction effort, and a favorable factor in this regard will be Poland’s hosting of an international conference on the reconstruction of Ukraine in 2026.
At the same time, a critically important joint area of action that will require special attention next year is countering fake news and disinformation aimed at fueling anti-Ukrainian and anti-Polish sentiments in both countries—efforts in which Russia is actively involved in order to weaken Western support for Ukraine at war, particularly in Poland.
Yuriy Banakhevych, Warsaw
Headline photo via the Office of the President of Ukraine