How Lukashenko’s Regime Plotted with Moscow to Carve Up Ukrainian Deposits

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarus has constructed an alternative raw-materials supply chain for its ceramics industry while simultaneously seeking access to a kaolin deposit near Druzhkivka.

Kaolin—Ukraine’s “white clay”—has long been prized globally. The country holds nearly 10% of the world’s reserves, with deposits considered among the highest quality in Europe. Until 2022, Belarus sourced almost all of its ceramic-grade kaolin from Ukraine. After the invasion, these supplies were officially cut off—but, as evidence suggests, not entirely.

Documents obtained by the Belarusian opposition group BelPol and reviewed by Ukrinform indicate that Belarusian state enterprises continue to receive Ukrainian raw materials—now sourced from parts of Donetsk region under Russian occupation. At the same time, officials in Minsk were negotiating with Moscow to secure control over Ukrainian kaolin deposits in the region—even before any potential occupation.

A CRITICAL INPUT FOR THE INDUSTRY

Kaolin is not merely an additive; it is the core input in the production of ceramic tiles, porcelain stoneware, and sanitary ware (such as toilets and sinks). This refractory white clay determines key product properties: whiteness, mechanical strength, density, and thermal resistance. Without high-grade kaolin, output becomes dull, brittle, and commercially unviable—undermining both market access and export revenues.

Belarus’s dependence became acute after 2022. Prior to the invasion, nearly 90% of the sector’s kaolin demand was met through imports from Ukraine. Belarus lacks domestic deposits of industrial-quality kaolin, and substitution without degrading product quality is effectively impossible.

The impact was most severe for the sector’s flagship producers. Minsk-based Keramin and Berezabudmaterialy OJSC in the Brest region faced the dual risk of declining product standards and erosion of their positions in export markets.

Minsk’s response was straightforward but legally and ethically problematic: to continue using Ukrainian kaolin, now sourced from territories currently occupied by Russia.

“For the Belarusian ceramics industry, Ukrainian kaolin is a fundamental component of competitiveness. After 2022, a shortage emerged that could not be offset by domestic resources or alternative imports without sacrificing quality. As a result, alternative supply chains were established, including from occupied Ukrainian territories,” said Volodymyr Zhyhar, an official representative of BelPol, in a comment to Ukrinform.

SUPPLIES FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: HOW THE SCHEME WORKS

Documents reviewed by BelPol point to a structured and ongoing supply mechanism for kaolin extracted in Russian-occupied areas of Donetsk region. A central role in this scheme is played by Nika Trade Invest LLC, a company registered in Donetsk.

In addition to its role in exporting coal and grain from occupied territories, the company is also engaged in extracting kaolin from the Bila Balka deposit in Volnovakha district—using assets illegally seized from the Ukrainian firms Donbasnerudprom Research and Production Enterprise LLC and Donbaskeramika LLC.

Notably, the company does not attempt to conceal these activities.

According to information published on its website, Nika Trade Invest LLC oversees the extraction, processing, and wholesale supply of both raw and refined kaolin from the primary deposit at Bila Balka, located roughly two kilometers west of the village of Trudove in Donetsk region’s Volnovakha district. The deposit is distinguished by the high quality of its kaolin, attributable to its chemical and mineralogical composition, enabling the production of materials tailored to a wide range of industrial applications. The company also manages logistics, offering rail deliveries “to any station in Russia and the CIS,” as well as road transport.

Documents indicate that the principal buyer of this kaolin is the Belarusian manufacturer Keramin. One of the largest ceramic producers in the CIS and Eastern Europe, the company manufactures nearly 18 million square meters of tiles and more than 1.5 million sanitary ceramic items annually. Despite its joint-stock structure, the Belarusian government holds a controlling stake—over 75% of shares—with Alyaksandr Lukashenko personally approving the move to full government control in 2012.

“The available documents confirm that kaolin supplies to Belarus were carried out systematically, under formal contracts and with a standard set of primary documentation— invoices, waybills, rail shipment orders, and quality certificates. These are not merely shadow transactions; this is a well-established commercial scheme that has been operating since at least 2023 and continues to this day,” Zhyhar said.

Under this arrangement, Nika Trade Invest LLC acts as both seller and consignor. A “legal buffer” role is played by its affiliated entity, Nika LLC, registered in Rostov-on-Don, which formally appears as the buyer in contracts. The end recipient is Keramin OJSC in Minsk. Shipments are transported by rail from stations in Khartsyzk and Volnovakha into Russian territory and onward to Belarus, terminating at the Minsk-South rail hub.

The volumes involved are industrial in scale. A single confirmed rail shipment to Keramin on September 25, 2023, exceeded 1,000 tonnes; other consignments ran into several hundred tonnes each.

Another buyer of this “white clay” is Berezabudmaterialy OJSC (brand Beryoza Ceramica), a Belarusian ceramic tile producer. As with Keramin, the company is effectively state-owned despite its joint-stock structure, with roughly 98% of shares held by the Republic of Belarus.

Documents show that, since at least 2025, batches of enriched kaolin have been shipped in big bags by road directly to Berezabudmaterialy. Invoice records indicate these deliveries bypassed the Rostov-based intermediary, Nika LLC, and were supplied directly.

“By our estimates, the documented value of supplies alone exceeds RUB 600 million (around USD 7.5 million). And that reflects only the portion we were able to verify. Given the scheme’s consistency and scale, the real volumes are significantly higher,” the BelPol representative said.

MINSK DID NOT WAIT: PRE-EMPTIVE CLAIMS ON UNSEIZED DEPOSITS

The supply chain is only part of the story. In parallel, Minsk pursued a coordinated institutional strategy at a higher level.

According to a July 1, 2024 letter from Belarus’s Ministry of Architecture and Construction to Alyaksandr Lukashenko, negotiations with Russia began as early as 2023 to lease refractory clay deposits near Druzhkivka in Donetsk region to Keramin. These deposits belong to Ukraine’s VESCO PrJSC and, at the time of the talks—and still today—remain under Ukrainian control.

Notably, the ministry’s letter refers to the deposit and associated property complex in Druzhkivka as having “previously belonged” to VESCO.

In effect, Belarusian officials—acting on Lukashenko’s instructions—were planning access to Ukrainian subsoil assets that Russia had not yet captured, evidently assuming this would change in the near term.

The process involved Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, the so-called DPR “authorities,” and the Russian Territories Development Fund. In 2023, however, Moscow told Minsk that consideration of the request was “premature,” citing the fact that the asset remained outside Russian control—in plain terms, Druzhkivka had not been seized.

This did not deter Minsk. In April 2024, following renewed directives from Lukashenko, Keramin assembled a fresh application package seeking to lease the property complex, despite the area remaining under Ukrainian control. Consultations with the Territories Development Fund produced the same outcome: any formal submission would be rejected on the same grounds as in 2023.

Even this did not deter officials in Minsk. On May 3, 2024, a request was sent to Ilnur Shagiahmetov, Director General of the Territories Development Fund, proposing a joint meeting; copies were forwarded to the Belarusian Embassy in Russia. The Fund declined, calling such a meeting impractical. It cited “heightened interest from Russian companies” in the asset and indicated it would be allocated through an open tender. Any alternative path, it added, would require an intergovernmental agreement.

Minsk persisted. After further consultations with the Belarusian embassy, officials decided to prepare a formal appeal from the Belarusian government to its Russian counterpart. The letter states explicitly: “Work to reach agreements on the development of a white-burning clay (kaolin) deposit in the Russian Federation will be continued by the Ministry of Architecture and Construction.”

“This official letter is highly revealing. It shows that, at both ministerial level and on Lukashenko’s personal instructions, Belarus was pursuing targeted efforts to secure control over Ukrainian deposits in anticipation of their future occupation. This is not a commercial initiative—it is a state-led strategy to divide seized assets,” Zhyhar said.

A SYSTEM, NOT ISOLATED EPISODES

The documents indicate that, following 2022, Belarus’s ceramics industry adapted to the loss of Ukrainian supplies by integrating into supply chains drawing on resources from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. This is not a series of ad hoc transactions, but a coherent, coordinated model.

At the same time, efforts continue at the state level to secure long-term access to Ukrainian deposits, premised on expectations of their potential occupation by Russia. The process involves key industrial players, relevant ministries, and Lukashenko himself.

All of this unfolds against ongoing sanctions pressure on Belarus’s ceramics sector from the EU and the United States. The use of raw materials sourced from occupied Ukrainian territory compounds these risks and raises serious questions about the reliability of Keramin and Berezabudmaterialy as partners for companies adhering to sanctions regimes.

“Every international partner or buyer of products from these enterprises must understand: they are made from raw materials extracted on occupied Ukrainian land. This is not merely a reputational issue—it is a matter of compliance with sanctions law,” Zhyhar emphasized.

Vasyl Korotkyi, Berlin

Headline photo via Andriushchenko Time