June's Biggest Burn Victims
The Heaviest Losses Suffered by the Russian Army During the First Month of Summer
Throughout the first month of summer, Ukraine's Defense Forces continued their long-range strike campaign against some of the most valuable assets in Russia's military arsenal: surface-to-air missile systems, radar installations, coastal surveillance stations, warships, airfields, logistics hubs, and fuel and energy infrastructure.
One defining feature of the month was the start of the holiday season in Russian-occupied Crimea. This year, however, it proved rather unusual for the occupiers. There was no baklava, no shrimp, no gasoline, and no electricity. Instead, tourists arriving from across the Russian border were treated to unlimited sleepless nights and explosive memories courtesy of frequent air raid alerts.
Throughout June, from Cape Tarkhankut to Kerch, Ukrainian drones and missiles reached even those corners of the peninsula where, until recently, the occupiers had felt completely untouchable. That became possible thanks to the sustained efforts of Ukraine's Defense Forces over previous months. On July 4, Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi reported that, since the beginning of the year, Ukrainian forces had eliminated 195 elements of Russia's air defense network, including 32 that quite literally "burned on the job" in June alone. A substantial share of these nearly 200 supposedly unparalleled air defense assets had been deployed to shield the occupying forces in Crimea.
Yet the scorching opening of Ukraine's summer campaign was felt far beyond the peninsula.
Russia's Baltic Fleet suddenly discovered that Kronstadt was no longer a place of tranquility. The Sea of Azov—which Russian propaganda has spent the past five years portraying as an "internal sea"—also ceased to be a safe haven for Russian vessels. And in Novorossiysk, more than 400 kilometers from Ukraine's coastline, where the remnants of the Black Sea Fleet have taken refuge at anchor, the descendants of Tsushima's defeated sailors learned that distance no longer guarantees safety.
This latest Ukrinform review examines the destruction of Russia's most valuable military hardware during June.
A WARM-UP AT THE STARTING LINE
Russia's so-called "second army of the world" entered the summer with little cause for optimism.
And for good reason.
On the night of June 2, Ukrainian forces simultaneously struck several key Russian military facilities. The targets included a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and gun system near the village of Vydne in occupied Crimea, Neva-B and Neva-B2M coastal radar stations in the Mariupol area, and a support vessel near Mizhvodne, close to Cape Tarkhankut.
The Neva-B (designation 1RL133) is a mobile coastal radar station designed for continuous maritime surface surveillance.
The mobile coastal radar station Neva-B
Technically, it is a Ka-band millimeter-wave radar. Although not a cutting-edge or highly classified system, it meets modern civilian and military coastal surveillance requirements thanks to its operating frequency of approximately 33.85 GHz and high-resolution imaging capabilities. Millimeter-wave technology allows it to detect even very small objects on the sea surface with remarkable precision. The radar can spot a person in the water or on shore at distances of up to 2 kilometers, a boat or passenger vehicle at up to 15 kilometers, and larger boats or trucks at up to 30 kilometers. Its instrumented detection range extends to 45 kilometers.
The system operates around the clock, automatically tracking dozens of targets simultaneously while providing targeting data for coastal missile batteries and artillery. Within Russia's coastal defense architecture, the Neva-B and its upgraded Neva-B2M variant serve as key assets for monitoring the waters of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
These are, of course, not strategic, multi-million-dollar radar complexes such as the Nebo-M, each valued at nearly $100 million. Depending on procurement arrangements and supporting infrastructure, however, a tactical millimeter-wave coastal radar station like the Neva-B is still worth anywhere from several tens of thousands to several hundred thousand U.S. dollars. According to Ukraine's Defense Forces, the destruction of the two coastal radar stations and their associated support equipment inflicted losses totaling tens of millions of rubles. That, however, in no way diminishes their operational importance.
A SPLIT THAT ENDED IN SINKING
A far more valuable prize for Ukraine's Defense Forces was a Project 1454 specialized support vessel, which joined the cruiser Moskva on the seabed near Mizhvodne in Crimea.
The vessel belonged to a rare class of auxiliary ships operated by Russia's Black Sea Fleet. It was equipped with specialized degaussing systems used to reduce the magnetic signatures of Russian warships and submarines, helping protect them from Ukrainian naval mines.
Project 1454 Specialized Support Vessel
According to confirmed intelligence and satellite imagery, the vessel sustained catastrophic hull damage below the waterline and sank at its berth near Mizhvodne. Given the depth of the water in the area and the nature of the blast damage, the ship has been rendered a total loss. Even if it were successfully raised from the seabed, it would be beyond repair, as its sophisticated onboard electronics and degaussing generators were completely flooded with seawater.
For Russia, the loss is effectively irreversible. With Turkey continuing to close the Bosphorus Strait to warships under the Montreux Convention, Moscow has no way of transferring a comparable degaussing vessel from its other fleets—at least not until the war is over.
As for the vessel's value, a useful benchmark is Ukraine's civilian search-and-rescue ship Sapphire, also a Project 1454 vessel. With nearly identical specifications—a length of about 58 meters and a full displacement of 1,670 tons—it was procured by the Ukrainian government for UAH 165 million, or roughly $4 million at the commercial exchange rate at the time. Equipped with specialized degaussing systems, dedicated generators, hydroacoustic equipment, and military-grade communications, the Russian naval support vessel is estimated to have been worth roughly three times as much.
June also saw Ukraine's "airborne delegation" pay a visit to Kronstadt, where it delivered a fiery greeting to the Project 20380 guided-missile corvette Boykiy. The warship had entered scheduled maintenance in a dry dock in February 2026 after making headlines for colliding with another Russian vessel—the research ship Admiral Vladimirskiy—while attempting to moor alongside a pier.
Project 20380 Boykiy Corvette
The Boykiy, the third Project 20380 corvette commissioned by Russia's Baltic Fleet, was launched on April 5, 2011, and officially entered service in May 2013. By Russian naval standards, it was still a relatively modern warship. For an extended period, it also escorted sanctioned tankers belonging to Russia's so-called shadow fleet.
When it was built, the corvette cost approximately 10 billion rubles, equivalent to about $300 million at the time. By 2021–2026, accounting for inflation and successive weapons upgrades, the replacement cost of a Project 20380 corvette is estimated at $350–400 million.
The Ukrainian drone strike ignited a major fire inside the hull, causing severe structural deformation and destroying key command-and-control systems. The damage effectively reduced the guided-missile warship to scrap metal, as repairing it would cost nearly as much as building a new corvette.
On the night of June 4, the focus shifted from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Azov.
Near the settlement of Yurkine, not far from Kerch, a Russian Project 10410 Svetlyak-class border patrol ship encountered serious trouble.
A Ukrainian drone caught up with the vessel while it was underway, striking the starboard side of its superstructure. At the moment of impact, a group of Russian sailors was on deck on the side from which the drone approached, attempting to shoot it down. Those crew members undoubtedly received one-way tickets to their favorite performer's "concert"—a fate they had fully earned.
Project 10410 Svetlyak-Class Border Patrol Ship
The damaged Project 10410 Svetlyak-class border patrol ship is estimated to be worth $20–30 million, depending on its specific variant and year of construction.
The Svetlyak is one of Russia's most widely produced patrol vessel classes. More than 40 ships have been built since 1988. Their hallmark is a top speed of 30–32 knots, achieved with the help of three powerful diesel engines. They are armed with either a 76.2 mm AK-176M automatic naval gun or a 30 mm AK-306 cannon, as well as grenade launchers and Igla man-portable air-defense systems.
Russia has also marketed modified versions of the class abroad. In the early 2000s, for example, Vietnam purchased Svetlyak-class patrol ships for approximately $15–20 million apiece.
A PREDICTABLE OUTCOME
Later that same day, Ukrainian drones decided not to limit their itinerary to the sea and paid another visit to occupied Crimea.
The Russians, for reasons unknown, failed to appreciate the visit. Offended by such an inhospitable reception, the drones promptly set a Pantsir-S1 air defense system ablaze near Strilkove on the Arabat Spit, before destroying an RSBN-4N short-range radio navigation system at Saky Air Base.
RSBN-4N short-range radio navigation system
The RSBN-4N provides precision approach guidance for aircraft, enables flight operations in adverse weather, and supports the overall operation of the military airfield.
According to publicly available Russian government procurement records, supplying a new or fully overhauled RSBN-4NM solid-state navigation system costs approximately 60 million rubles—roughly $650,000–700,000. That price typically covers not only the equipment itself but also antenna arrays, cabling, remote indicators for the control tower, and installation and commissioning.
Far greater problems arrived for Russia by the end of the first week of summer.
On the night of June 7, Ukrainian drones simultaneously struck one of Russia's most valuable air defense assets—a S-400 Triumf battery near Kurortne in occupied Crimea—as well as an Osa surface-to-air missile system in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
S-400 Triumf Surface-to-Air Missile System
The destruction of an Osa system is hardly remarkable. It is, after all, an aging short-range air defense system. The S-400 Triumf, however, occupies an entirely different place in Russia's military mythology.
For years, Russian propaganda has promoted the S-400 as a genuine "wonder weapon" and one of the Kremlin's flagship examples of supposedly unparalleled military technology. It has been marketed as "the world's best air defense system," allegedly capable of intercepting virtually any aerial target at ranges of up to 400 kilometers.
The war has repeatedly exposed the irony of those claims: the more insistently Russian officials proclaim the invincibility of their latest Wunderwaffe, the more frequently Ukrainian drone operators manage to locate—and destroy—it.
A single S-400 battery costs the Russian state several hundred million U.S. dollars.
THE TOR NO LONGER WEARS THE PANTSIR
In April and May, the Tor family of surface-to-air missile systems comfortably topped the unofficial "loser of the month" rankings, leading the field in spectacular encounters with Ukrainian drones.
With the arrival of summer, however, despite the Scandinavian namesake's best efforts to remain on the podium, other contenders stole the spotlight.
Tor-M2 air-defense missile system
On June 10, the first Tor-M2 of the season dropped out of the race near Vershyna Druha, taking a Buk-M3 with it near Shevchenkove. Three days later, a second Tor-M2 met the same fate. After that, however, this particular class of Russian hardware largely vanished from the crosshairs of Ukrainian drone operators for the remainder of the month.
For reference, a single Tor-M2 system is estimated to cost $25–30 million.
The Buk-M3 is even more expensive. Its 9A317M self-propelled launcher alone is valued at roughly $15–20 million. Equipped with its own radar, it is capable of operating autonomously. A complete Buk-M3 battery is generally estimated to cost $45–50 million.
Buk-M3 Surface-to-Air Missile System
The Buk-M3 is one of Russia's most advanced medium-range air defense systems. It can simultaneously track dozens of aerial targets and engage aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
Unlike earlier versions, the Buk-M3 employs sealed launch canisters containing 9M317M missiles rather than exposed launch rails. These missiles feature active radar seekers and can engage targets at ranges of up to 70 kilometers and altitudes of up to 35 kilometers. Each missile is estimated to cost $300,000–500,000, and a single Buk-M3 launcher carries six of them.
Osa Surface-to-Air Missile System
By mid-June, another Osa system had joined the growing list of Russian air defense losses after being destroyed near Spartak in Donetsk Oblast.
The undisputed "losers of the month," however, were the Pantsir family of short-range surface-to-air missile and gun systems, which claimed first place by a comfortable margin in the race to follow the cruiser Moskva.
In addition to the systems destroyed earlier in the month, the late-June tally included a Pantsir-S2, which operators from Ukraine's Defense Intelligence Directorate (HUR) literally burned out of its camouflaged shelter near Dolynske. HUR also destroyed two Pantsir-S1 systems near the Kerch Strait, along with another Pantsir-S1 near Feodosia, where several components of an S-400 air defense system were also taken out.
Pantsir-S2 Air Defense System
Interestingly enough, Russia has begun concealing some of its mobile air defense systems in underground shelters. As recent events have demonstrated, however, even that does not guarantee their survival. The very fact that Russia is now building underground bunkers for mobile SAM systems speaks for itself: Ukrainian drones have become one of the deadliest threats facing its air defenses.
A BRUTAL MONTH FOR RUSSIAN RADARS
June proved especially devastating for Russia's radar network. Over the course of the month, Ukraine's Defense Forces destroyed 24 enemy radar stations, dismantling Russia's surveillance and early-warning capabilities with systematic precision.
Among the first casualties were two familiar subjects of these reviews. On June 9, operators from Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces almost simultaneously sent two P-18 Terek radar stations in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the scrap heap.
P-18 Terek Radar
Originally developed in the late 1960s, the P-18 Terek has undergone multiple modernization programs and remains one of Russia's principal VHF-band radar systems. Operating in the meter-wave spectrum, it is particularly effective at detecting low-observable targets, including cruise missiles and aircraft with reduced radar cross-sections.
Russia recognizes the value of these aging but still capable radars—and so do Ukrainian drone operators. Accordingly, on June 19, another P-18 followed its two predecessors into oblivion, again on the Zaporizhzhia front.
Russia's radar assets fared no better in Crimea. Beginning in mid-June, Ukrainian drones launched what amounted to a systematic hunt for the peninsula's coastal radar network.
During the night of June 15–16 alone, Ukrainian drones struck five coastal radar stations positioned along Crimea's western shoreline, from Sterehushche through Snizhne, Cape Tarkhankut, Portove, and Sievierne.
The operation effectively created a 100-kilometer blind spot in Russia's air defense coverage along one of the most strategically important stretches of the Crimean coast.
The next targets were far more expensive.
On June 21, Ukrainian forces reported striking two major radar systems: a 39N6 Kasta-2E2 near Kurortne and a 55Zh6U Nebo-U near Kerch.
39N6 Kasta-2E2 Radar
The 39N6 Kasta-2E2 is a mobile three-coordinate radar designed primarily to detect low-altitude aerial targets. Depending on its configuration—including the installation of elevated antenna masts such as a 50-meter tower—the system is estimated to cost between $30 million and more than $60 million.
The most valuable radar destroyed during June, however, was the Nebo-U.
This long-range, three-coordinate strategic radar is capable of monitoring airspace at distances of up to 600 kilometers. Operating in the VHF (meter-wave) band, it forms one of the cornerstones of Russia's early warning network, providing the first alerts to other air defense assets about approaching aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
For Ukraine's Defense Forces, this was a $100 million target in the most literal sense. That is the estimated value of a single 55Zh6U Nebo-U radar. Its enormous price reflects its massive dimensions, powerful transmitter, and sophisticated electronics, much of which has historically relied on imported components. Produced only in limited numbers, the Nebo-U remains one of the scarcest and most valuable assets in Russia's radar inventory.
55Zh6U Nebo-U Radar
Just two days later, fortune smiled on Ukrainian drone operators once again. Near Kerch, they destroyed another Nebo-U radar, along with an S-300 surface-to-air missile launcher and a Pantsir-S1 air defense system.
As an added bonus, they also struck an exceptionally valuable target—the TRLK-10 Skala-M, a dual-use (civilian and military) route surveillance radar complex.
Unlike mobile military air defense radars, the Skala-M is an automated system designed for the strategic monitoring of air traffic along established flight routes and in terminal approach zones over long distances. It integrates radar data from multiple sources into a single command-and-control network.
The complex can detect and determine the coordinates of aircraft, large unmanned aerial vehicles, and other airborne objects at ranges of 350–400 kilometers. Russian forces have integrated civilian Skala-M systems into their automated air defense command networks, using their data to provide target designation for combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems.
TRLK-10 Skala-M
According to Russian government procurement contracts, a stationary TRLK-10 Skala-M radar complex is valued at approximately $15–20 million.
Its price reflects the nature of the installation. Unlike mobile truck-mounted radar systems, the Skala-M is a permanent facility requiring substantial infrastructure, including support towers, equipment buildings, autonomous power systems, and a protective radome housing the antenna.
Its electronics combine a primary surveillance radar, which detects objects by processing reflected radio signals, with a Koren secondary surveillance radar that reads aircraft transponder data, all supported by powerful computing systems that fuse and process the incoming information.
Although the Skala-M is less expensive than strategic military radar systems such as the Nebo-U, its destruction is nevertheless a significant blow to Russia. Only a limited number of these complexes are in service, and replacing one is a lengthy process involving manufacturing, transportation, and extensive on-site construction that can take many months.
By the end of June, Russia's radar losses had continued to mount. Ukrainian forces destroyed an ST-68U radar near Dzhankoi, as well as another ST-68, a 48Ya6-K1 Podlyot radar near Yevpatoriia, and a Pantsir-S1 air defense system in the Feodosia area.
ST-68U Radar
The market value of the Soviet-designed ST-68 three-coordinate radar—and its upgraded variants, the ST-68U/19Zh6 (NATO reporting name: Tin Shield)—is estimated at $4.5–7 million for a fully operational mobile system.
Despite its age, the radar remains both a valuable military asset and a high-priority target because of its unique capabilities. The ST-68 was specifically designed as a low-altitude surveillance radar, with the ability to detect targets flying extremely close to the ground while using the terrain to mask their approach.
48Ya6-K1 Podlyot Low-Altitude Surveillance Radar
Russia invested roughly twice as much—up to $15 million—in developing the Podlyot, a radar specifically intended to counter cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. Introduced in the 2010s, this supposedly unparalleled system's principal selling point was its active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which was advertised as capable of detecting even small plastic drones with extremely low radar cross-sections—targets that older radars might dismiss as flocks of birds or ground clutter.
As events have shown, however, that particular advantage proved rather less decisive than advertised. It did not help all that much.
Ivan Stupak, Danylo Opanasenko
Photos are for illustrative purposes and are sourced from publicly available sources