Karel Řehka, Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces

Karel Řehka is a renowned figure in the Czech Republic for his integrity and courage in speaking uncomfortable truths. Recently, this stance—which at times involves support for Ukraine (in particular, the general has argued for the advisability and propriety of transferring L-159 aircraft to Kyiv). The general's public stance annoyed the new authorities, who are trying to "rein him in" by canceling a planned foreign visit, banning him from appearing on a popular talk show, and restricting his communication with journalists.

The interview with Ukrinform was an exception. We chose not to address those aircraft and instead began our conversation with the military commander’s personal commitment to supporting Ukraine.

THE MAJORITY OF CZECH SOCIETY IS WILLING TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING UKRAINE

- The Czech Republic is known for mobilizing public and private resources to help Ukraine. You yourself are engaged in activists such as Nemesis drone campaign, which is unusual for a high-rank officer. What have been your motives?

- I'm not just a member of the military I am also a part of society; I'm a citizen and I just think it's the morally right thing to do. I'm not per se a member of the group, but I support it publicly and I basically give them support.

I'm proud that Czech society has been helping from the very beginning and that people do their best to support your country. But I also think it is very good for our defense, our resilience prom the point of view of knowledge, experience from the battlefield, know-how.

All these reasons meant that I basically didn’t hesitate. And it's not only that I know the people (Skupina D) personally. If anyone else came to me and it was a good project, I would still support it. And actually it's not just me, there are a lot of people who are in the military, but in their own social life or free time they do many other things to support Ukraine.

Most of Czech society is still willing to help, even though the war has been going on for a long time.

- President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky awarded you in 2023 with the Ukrainian Order of Merit, II degree for a significant special contribution to the value of interstate cooperation, support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. What does that mean for you?

- It is a big honour and privilege. But I think it’s not really about me personally. It’s about a lot of people and the whole team. So it’s an award for all of us.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC HAS PROVIDED UKRAINE WITH EVERYTHING IT COULD

- Czech was one of the first to come to help Ukraine after the full-scale invasion started 4 years ago. Could you please describe the main forms of Czech military assistance provided to Ukraine so far?

- Actually, the first deliveries from the Czech Republic were shortly before February 24. We started supplying whatever equipment we could even before the invasion started, and since the first minutes we were supporting Ukraine.

- So you expected something like that?

- Well, I wasn’t in my current position during those first days, I wasn’t part of the decision-making. But it was a political decision to support Ukraine, and I think it was the right one.

What I did when I came to my position was that we took a number of internal steps, such as revising our defense plans, our wartime structures, and so on. We also carried out many inventories of our mobilization stocks and supplies, and we tried to identify things we could provide without weakening our own defense.

We managed to identify a lot of equipment that was later sent to Ukraine based on governmental decisions, because we had a government that supported it. There was a lot of equipment: tanks, BMPs, air defense systems, a lot of ammunition, medical supplies — basically everything you can think of.   

Actually, the military contribution was just a part of it, and a smaller part — much more equipment went through the defense industry.

If I consider equipment support, we basically gave almost everything we could give in those first years.

- You also provide training.

- Yes, different types of training, mostly under the auspices of EUMAM UA. At first, we had maneuver units coming in — first at the battalion level, then at the company level, plus specialist training. The specialist training was usually focused on medical training, counter-IED, EOD, engineering training, and CBRN defense (protection against chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons).

For example, we had maintenance personnel trained here to maintain certain equipment. When we provided one of the air defense systems, we also trained some crews. We as well provided some planning and staff training for officers. We even provided English language training for a few people.

We also have mobile training teams in different military specialties, and we sent them to Poland and Germany to conduct training. In total, in 2022-2024, almost 4,300 military personnel were trained in the Czech Republic, and 2,770 in Poland. In 2025, 365 in our country and 2,115 in Poland and Germany.

The organization of training is coordinated in accordance with the requirements of the Ukrainian side. Basically, we tried to react to the demand, and whatever we could provide, we provided.

But it's not just that we gave something to the Ukrainian military: as time went on, we got more and more in return — knowledge and experience from the high-intensity warfare battlefield, which we wouldn’t get otherwise. We learn from them — for example, the use of drones, FPV drones, and so on. We built a model battlefield based on satellite and aerial imagery and other experience, we replicated a section of trench warfare — essentially part of the frontline — in our training area. We built fortifications and then invited experienced Ukrainians who shared their lessons learned about how they conduct operations. Our instructors learned from them, and later when new Ukrainian units came for training, we tried to incorporate that knowledge into the training of new soldiers.

So we as the Czech military also gained a lot from it. We had the chance to build partnerships. We organised visits between our military academies. I myself visited Ukraine a few times as well.

- How many times did you visit Ukraine?

- I visited three times as Chief of Defense. While there, I met with General Zaluzhny and later with Oleksandr Syrskyi. I met members of their staffs, received briefings, including intelligence briefings from HUR. At the beginning I also had the chance to visit some forward positions. Soldiers showed us the places where battles had taken place and explained how the fighting unfolded.

I think it is important to be there, to understand the reality and to speak directly with our partners. For me it was also important to identify whether our support was sufficient or whether we could do more. I also think it is morally important to show that Ukraine is not alone. It sends a strong signal.

- Do you think Czech support will continue in any form?

- Obviously, the forms, shapes, and levels of support are driven by political decisions that we, as the military, have to follow. But I believe and hope it will continue. Some forms of support are still ongoing.

I'm very grateful that our government decided to continue the Czech ammunition initiative, because I know that it is really important. And that’s not only my assessment — it is also the assessment of our Ukrainian counterparts and of NATO.

What is also significant, is that it’s not only the state that is involved. It is also the industry, the private sector, and society. There are a lot of crowdfunding projects here — people are still willing to contribute money. I know it may not be the most significant part in terms of scale, but it is important.

THE RUSSIAN INVASION IN 2022 CHANGED EVERYTHING

- What are the key military lessons European armies, including the Czech Army have learned from this war? How does the war shape Czech Republic’s defense posture and military readiness?

- There are nationwide strategic lessons, operational lessons, and tactical lessons for the military.

This large-scale invasion in 2022 changed everything. The war had been ongoing for some time, but this invasion was the final wake-up call that actually worked for NATO, for the EU, for the West. The one after Crimea did not work.

Before that, our military had been built during the era of NATO crisis-response operations abroad. That has now changed. We are now in an era of collective deterrence and defense. That shift happened because the perception of the threat has changed.

In the Czech Republic this was reflected by the adoption of a new National security strategy and a new National defense strategy, which gave our military completely different tasks. It clearly stated that our military — and not only the military, but the whole society, the whole nation — should prepare for a large-scale, high-intensity conflict with a technologically advanced enemy that may possess nuclear weapons. Basically, it says that we should be ready for the possibility of war with Russia which is the most imminent and urgent threat for us.

I would say that the nationwide lesson is that society as a whole must be resilient. War is not only about the military — it is about everyone. That is probably the number one lesson.

Another important lesson is the danger of strategic dependencies — whether in energy, technology, or other sectors. You have to think carefully about how you build those dependencies so that you cannot be blackmailed later.

On military level, one lesson is that attrition is not a dirty word, as people sometimes thought. Attrition is an integral part of any large-scale conflict. It has always been like that throughout history. The operational capacity of militaries is a combination of quality and quantity — and quantity matters. In terms of manpower, that means you need a system that generates sufficient reserves, and you need the legal framework that allows you to use them. We still do not fully have this.

As for equipment, the lesson is the security of supplies and the importance of the defense industry.

If we go down to the tactical level — what is happening on the battlefield — one key factor is the transparency of the battlefield. The number of sensors has increased dramatically, which shortens decision-making time and reduces the time between the sensor and the shooter — including decision-making and information processing. This will likely require greater use of new technologies and disruptive technologies, such as AI, and the ability to process large amounts of data.

Another obvious lesson is the widespread use of unmanned systems and, in the future, possibly autonomous systems.

And one very important lesson is that adaptability has become an integral part of combat power. It is not enough to have maneuver, firepower, protection, command and control, and information systems organized properly. You must also be able to adapt continuously. This also requires good cooperation with industry and changes in procurement processes, research, and development.

RUSSIANS ARE CARRYING OUT MANY DE-STABILIZING MEASURES

- President Petr Pavel, while visiting the Baltic states, said that people and politicians there clearly understand the real threat coming from Russia. In some countries in Central Europe and further west, the sense of alert is not as strong. In your view, how can the public be made to understand the situation without causing panic?

- That is something I try to do all the time, and sometimes I am criticized for it.

During the nearly four years I spent in my position, one of my priorities was to help cultivate strategic culture and to explain things openly. It’s not about scaring people. It’s about educating them so that they understand.

Obviously, the Russians do not like this. They conduct many destabilizing activities — in cyberspace, through disinformation, and so on. They try to confuse people, to make them think that there may be another version of reality. They also try to polarize society and create divisions. Sometimes they are successful.

They also try to increase mistrust toward the state and institutions. That is critical, because if a state wants to function effectively during a major crisis, it needs a certain level of social cohesion and trust.

The only way to solve this problem is to have a society that understands the situation, understands the threat, and has a sense of urgency. I think the biggest difference between the Baltic states, Poland, and other countries on NATO’s eastern flank, and countries like ours that are further to the rear, is precisely this sense of urgency in society. If people feel that urgency, they will ask their political leaders: “What are you doing about it?”

- Last week you met here, in Prague your German counterpart, Gen. Carsten Breuer, who says for quite some time that Russia might be able, perhaps by 2029, to attack NATO. Do you share this view?

- Well, basically most of us, chiefs of defense, have similar views.

When people ask me, “Are you saying the war is coming?” I answer that I am not saying the war is coming. I am saying that it may come. And if we want to avoid it, we need to be strong and we need credible deterrence — collective deterrence as NATO, or perhaps even beyond NATO, together with partners.

If you want to have credible deterrence, you must have real defense capabilities and capacities. You also need the will to use them. And your adversary must understand that you have both.

We see in Ukraine now that the Russians made a serious miscalculation. They did not expect to become bogged down in a war that has lasted four years and to lose thousands of people every month. I don’t think that was their intention. And it is our responsibility to do our best to make sure they do not make such a miscalculation again toward someone else.

IF ORDERED, WE WILL FIGHT WITHOUT HESITATION

- Still, if Russia were to stage some kind of provocation, say, in the Baltics — which seems the most obvious scenario — would NATO stand together and react quickly?

- If I speak from the military perspective — because ultimately this is about political decisions and political cohesion, since political leaders give the orders and make the decisions — then yes.

Do we have problems with capabilities and capacities? Yes. Do we have problems with stockpiles, ammunition, and other resources? Yes, of course we do. We did not invest enough in defense in previous decades, and for a long time we prepared for different types of scenarios. But let me be clear: if it happened tomorrow we would go and fight with whatever we have. There is no hesitation.

As for political cohesion and NATO cohesion — yes, I absolutely believe we would activate collective defense if necessary. Because there is no alternative. Because if it did not, that would be the end of NATO. And I believe everyone understands that such a situation would be a tragedy for all of us. And that is exactly what Russia wants.

NATO is based on trust — on the belief that every member is willing to place part of its sovereignty into the alliance for collective security. And for many countries, it is the best way — and sometimes the only way — to guarantee their security. It is also the cheapest way to provide citizens with security and defense. And regardless of which government is in power now, was in power in the past, or will be in power in the future, everyone recognizes this.

- Russia is provoking every day and is already practically conducting a hybrid war. Wouldn’t it have been wise that NATO responds with asymmetric measures?

- It is complicated — both politically and legally. Article 5 has been activated only once in NATO’s history, after the September 11 attacks, in support of the United States. It demonstrated unity. Several times we have also activated Article 4 consultations, which are usually a precursor to Article 5. So the mechanism exists, and it is possible to react.

Another element is strategic ambiguity. NATO maintains a certain level of strategic ambiguity, and that is the right approach. If everything were predictable you would become too readable for the adversary. Russia knows that NATO has a wide range of possible responses — informational, diplomatic, and military.

Then you always have to assess each incident: what exactly happened, how serious it is, and what kind of response would be appropriate. For example, could NATO activate collective defense as a result of actions in cyberspace? Yes, definitely — if those actions cause loss of human life, if the consequences are severe enough. In such cases the response might even include conventional military means, not only cyber measures.

So such a scenario is possible, but the decision would always depend on political consensus, consultations, and decision-making processes.

A STRONG ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE SERVES OUR INTERESTS

- Ukraine thankful for whatever help we get, but – and not only we say so – that at least at the beginning it was “too little, too late.” Was this because Russia possesses nuclear weapons? Was it caution, fear or perhaps a reluctance to really defeat Russia?

- Well, again, this is mainly about political decisions, and I don’t want to judge them. But when we discuss it among soldiers, I believe the main reason was that everyone was initially in shock. Even though there had been warnings and predictions.

Second, Ukraine was not part of NATO structures, so there was no predefined mechanism for this situation. It was different from collective defense inside the alliance. Supporting a friendly country that is outside NATO is a different situation.

But I think the main reason for hesitation was fear of entering an escalation spiral that could theoretically lead to the use of nuclear weapons — which would be a horrific tragedy for everyone, including Ukraine. So I think many leaders were acting responsibly and cautiously. Many decisions were influenced more by public sentiment than by strategic analysis.

- How do you see the development on the battlefield in the coming period? How long could such a war last?

- It is very difficult to say, I don’t have a crystal ball. The outcome of the war depends greatly on the support Ukraine receives from the collective West, from democratic and like-minded countries that support Ukraine.

Well, no war can last forever. This is purely a war of attrition now and it is extremely costly for both sides. But if you compare the number of citizens and the size of the population — the pool for manpower — there is clearly an asymmetry, and it is not favourable for Ukraine if this continues indefinitely.

I believe it is important to push to start some kind of negotiation process. The problem is that at the moment I do not see Russia trying to end this war. Ultimately, it will be up to the international community to apply sufficient pressure to push Russia toward ending it.

Of course, it should not be peace at all costs - the worst thing that could happen would be to end the war at any cost and then simply return to “business as usual”. We should not forget who the aggressor is, who committed war crimes, who the victim is, and who is defending their country. Any outcome of this war must take this into account.

- What kind of post-war security architecture could guarantee Ukraine’s security and deter future Russian aggression?

- Again, this is a very political question. I can only give my personal judgment based on my military and defense experience.

There are many debates about whether Ukraine should join NATO or not, whether this is realistic now or in the future, about accession to the European Union, and so on. I personally believe it is important that Ukraine becomes as soon as possible. That is important both for Ukraine and for us. And if that requires new formats or new arrangements, then so be it.

The second point concerns the future security architecture. I still believe in NATO’s system of collective deterrence and defense. Europe must maintain the strong transatlantic link with the United States, but at the same time take more responsibility and strengthen the European pillar of collective defense as much as possible, integrate the European Union’s security and defense agenda with NATO as closely as possible. This is already happening.

At the same time, we will probably see more “coalitions of the willing.” When there is no full consensus within a large organization, or when an organization is not the most efficient framework for a specific task, countries create coalitions to act together. I believe similar coalitions will also play a role in ensuring Ukraine’s security.

However, based on my experience and on many high-level political and military discussions I have witnessed, I believe that the most important guarantee of Ukraine’s future security in the short and medium term, the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression is a strong Ukraine and a strong Ukrainian military. Helping Ukraine build such a military is clearly in our best interest.

- What about foreign military presence — do you exclude that?

- No, I do not exclude it. I think it could also be possible. But the main focus of any foreign military presence should be to help Ukraine build its own capabilities.

- Is Ukrainian Army, strictly militarily, fit for NATO at this stage?

- When it comes to military interoperability — the interoperability of doctrines, procedures, mapping systems, and similar technical aspects — that is actually the least problematic part. Those things could be fixed very quickly.

The bigger issues relate to other requirements, which are more connected to the political system: civilian democratic control of the military and other institutional aspects.

So, from a purely military standpoint, integrating Ukraine into NATO would probably be the least difficult part. If there is the political will to do it, I believe it could be done reasonably quickly. In that sense, it is the smallest problem.

- For several days we witness a war in the Gulf. We see that Russia helps Iran and at the same time, Ukrainian specialists are advising the Gulf countries to counter iranian and russian drones…

- What we are observing is something interesting. In the past there was often a transfer of know-how from the Middle East to Europe — for example regarding terrorist tactics or improvised explosive devices. Now we see the opposite: a transfer of lessons learned and operational experience from Europe to the Middle East. In particular, it concerns how to deal asymmetrically with large numbers of cheap drones without relying only on a limited number of very sophisticated and expensive weapons. This is exactly the problem Ukraine has faced in the war with Russia. You cannot shoot down every Shahed drone with expensive missiles, for example. So knowledge gained in Ukraine is now helping to protect partners of the US and other countries in the region.

- Some people say we are in the Third World War already. What would you say to that?  

- No, we are not in the Third World War. And I believe we will not be.

Much depends on us. If we act responsibly, if we build credible deterrence and defense quickly enough, and if Russia understands that any reckless action would be disastrous — especially for them — then they will not even attempt it. If they understand that there is no chance of success, then I believe we will remain safe.

I am an optimist.

Olga Tanasiichuk, Prague

The photos are provided by the author