Ihor Semyvolos, Director of the Middle East Research Center

Two weeks into the war in Iran, the conflict has generated more questions than answers. Yet understanding its trajectory is increasingly important not only for the Middle East but also for other regions affected by the geopolitical ripple effects, including Ukraine.

To assess the current dynamics and possible scenarios, Ukrinform spoke with Ihor Semyvolos, director of the Middle East Research Center and a prominent analyst of Middle East affairs.

Q: A resolution of the United Nations Security Council condemns Iran’s attacks, calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and expresses concern that Tehran is targeting infrastructure — including ports and energy facilities — in the Persian Gulf region. Thirteen Council members supported the resolution, while two abstained — and we know which ones. How significant is this step, and is the resolution likely to affect the situation?

A: The resolution is quite controversial if we consider how the war actually began and the broader context surrounding it. It is worth looking back at last year, when the first Israeli–Iranian war took place, and at the current situation in which a coalition of Israel and the United States has moved against Iran, as well as the twists and turns of the diplomatic process that ultimately ended without results.

However, in this story the Iranians likely understood where events might lead; the only real question was when. They remembered the experience of last year, when after negotiations collapsed and the conflict entered its next phase, Israeli forces carried out strikes and the Americans later joined in. For that reason, Tehran had been preparing precisely for such a scenario.

Shortly before the UN resolution was adopted, Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, publicly outlined three conditions under which Tehran would consider ending the war. These included recognition of Iran’s sovereignty and its right to uranium enrichment, full compensation for war damage, and the withdrawal of American forces from the region.

These demands are extremely difficult to meet. As a result, we now see a strategic deadlock emerging: on the one hand, a relatively weak international resolution, and on the other, uncompromising positions from the Iranian leadership.

This combination has left both United States and Israel facing a complex strategic dilemma as the conflict enters a new and potentially more volatile phase.

Two weeks of war suggest the conflict is entering a new stage. On the one hand, escalation remains entirely possible; on the other, the confrontation could shift into a different operational phase. Many analysts argue that without a ground operation it will be difficult to achieve decisive results. At the same time, the political costs of such a move would be significant for Donald Trump, particularly in the United States, where public opinion polling indicates limited support for the war.

Q: Any assessment of how the current campaign might end depends largely on how its objectives are defined. In this context, it is worth recalling last year’s twelve-day confrontation, when the United States conducted airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. At the time, Trump declared that the nuclear threat had been eliminated and that Iran’s nuclear potential had been destroyed. The evolution of the current war, however, suggests that the goals of the campaign have shifted — whether deliberately or as a consequence of battlefield realities.

According to figures cited by the Pentagon, the United States spent approximately $11.3 billion on the conflict during its first six days alone. Yet Iran continues to resist and the political system in Tehran remains intact. Despite this, Trump has repeatedly stated that the United States has already achieved victory. The question, however, is what such a victory would actually entail. Would it mean securing control over more than 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, or something broader?

A: Analyzing Trump’s rhetoric is not straightforward. His narratives frequently shift or contradict one another, which complicates attempts to define the end state of the campaign. Early in the conflict, regime change in Iran was mentioned among possible objectives. Over time, however, that language largely disappeared from official rhetoric. Instead, more concrete security goals began to dominate: degrading Iran’s missile capabilities, neutralizing enriched uranium stockpiles, and limiting Tehran’s strategic deterrent. In other words, these are objectives that can at least be assessed in terms of whether tangible results have been achieved.

Even these objectives present significant operational challenges. In practice, they could be achieved only through two mechanisms: Iran’s capitulation or the physical seizure of key assets. The former does not appear imminent. The latter would be extremely difficult. While uranium stockpiles might theoretically be secured, missile infrastructure is dispersed across the country and protected by hardened facilities, including underground production sites. Iran’s military-industrial capacity should not be exaggerated, but it nonetheless includes a network of facilities capable of sustaining missile production.

Reports from the United States and Israel suggesting that the intensity of strike waves is decreasing may indicate some operational progress. However, the continued exchange of attacks also reflects the ongoing expenditure of resources and the persistence of a high level of escalation. Under such conditions, neither side can easily shift to a lower-intensity posture. This dynamic affects not only Israel, which remains under constant threat of strikes, but also the broader security environment of the Persian Gulf region.

At the same time, the countries of the Persian Gulf are themselves increasingly exposed to the conflict, facing attacks from both missiles and drones. Geography plays a role here: the distances involved make such strikes relatively feasible. Some of the drones used in these attacks may be variants of the Shahed drones, produced in Russia or modified with Russian assistance.

There is a certain irony in this dynamic. Several Arab states — most notably the United Arab Emirates — were heavily involved in shadow supply chains that provided Russia with components used in the production of missiles and drones. In this sense, the situation has a clear “boomerang” effect: Emirati companies that once profited from gray-market trade now find themselves in a region increasingly vulnerable to the very technologies they helped enable.

Q: Meanwhile, the exchange of strikes continues. Despite optimistic briefings from the Pentagon and confident statements from Donald Trump, Iran’s military potential clearly has not been eliminated. Its remaining capabilities can only be assessed indirectly. One such indicator is the growing interest of Gulf states in Ukrainian expertise. Several countries in the region have reportedly approached Ukraine seeking countermeasures and operational know-how to defend against Shahed-type drones.

A potential ground operation would represent a qualitatively different stage of the war — effectively a new conflict. Trump has not ruled out such a possibility, but the scale of the undertaking would be enormous. Iran’s territory is vast, and conducting a sustained land campaign would require resources far beyond those currently deployed in the region. Tehran’s preparations for a potential confrontation with Israel and the United States have long been built around an asymmetric defense strategy.

This is why the energy dimension of the war has become increasingly important. Disruptions to oil and gas exports from the Persian Gulf have already affected global markets. In this context, an obvious question arises: would removing Iran’s ability to threaten or control the Strait of Hormuz — thereby restoring freedom of commercial shipping, particularly for oil — effectively mark the end of the conflict?

A: Expectations surrounding the war may have been shaped by an overly optimistic assumption — namely, that direct American involvement would quickly overwhelm Iran. When we now analyze the first days of the war, even the most optimistic estimates voiced by the Pentagon suggested that the conflict could last until the end of March. From the outset, the United States spoke of a 30-day timeframe, while not ruling out the possibility that the campaign might extend beyond that.

From this perspective, the current moment does not yet represent a decisive turning point. Rather, it is a phase in which Washington must assess what has worked and what has not — and whether it had a credible contingency plan in case the initial strikes failed to break Iran’s institutional resilience. One key question is whether U.S. planners anticipated that Iranian command structures could continue operating even if central coordination was disrupted.

How long such a system can function remains uncertain. It may continue for several weeks, but over time structural weaknesses could begin to surface. Early signs of tension are already visible within Iran’s political system. Differences between elements of the political leadership and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have begun to emerge, ranging from conciliatory statements by President Masoud Pezeshkian toward Arab countries affected by the conflict to hardline rhetoric from the IRGC questioning his position.

For now, the picture remains mixed. On one hand, the United States and its partners have encountered a well-prepared asymmetric defense. On the other, the long-term political and military consequences of the war remain uncertain — and will likely only become clear over time.

Regarding the possibility of a ground operation, statements by Donald Trump that such a scenario cannot be ruled out serve primarily to maintain a certain level of escalation and strategic pressure. Early attempts to explore alternatives — including the idea of mobilizing Kurdish forces similar to the Peshmerga or reaching arrangements with other opposition groups inside Iran — appear to have yielded little tangible progress so far. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that such efforts continue behind the scenes.

One of the main challenges for Washington is the absence of a unified opposition center inside Iran. Among the most visible political figures is Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last shah, who has positioned himself as a potential transitional leader. His supporters argue that he could unite a significant segment of Iranian society and guide the country through a period of political transition. However, this camp does not appear to represent a majority within the broader Iranian opposition.

Another segment of the opposition comes from circles often described as moderate Islamists. These groups question the authority of the supreme leader and advocate convening a constituent assembly that would amend the constitution and restore a republican system resembling the structure that existed before the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In practice, however, such proposals remain largely theoretical. Under wartime conditions — marked by strict counterintelligence controls and extensive repression — these calls are unlikely to translate into organized political action.

A more limited military objective discussed by some analysts involves securing Iran’s coastline along the Persian Gulf, including key oil terminals and the critical entry and exit points of the Strait of Hormuz. In principle, such an operation might be feasible. Yet even this scenario would not necessarily guarantee long-term security, particularly given the ability of Shahed drones to be launched from long distances.

Neutralizing Iran’s naval capabilities — including its so-called “mosquito fleet” of small, fast-attack craft — and reopening the Strait of Hormuz would require extensive resources. The operation would involve large-scale mine-clearing efforts, specialized naval assets, and sustained maritime security operations. At present, the number of ships and technical capabilities deployed in the region appears insufficient to carry out such a mission quickly or decisively.

Providing naval escorts for commercial tankers would also be extremely costly for the United States. For the time being, oil tankers are passing through the Strait of Hormuz largely at their own risk — and not always successfully.

Several regional states have already declared force majeure in response to the disruption of maritime trade, including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The situation is somewhat more manageable in Saudi Arabia, which has the capacity to redirect a portion of its oil exports through pipeline infrastructure. The Emirates also possess limited alternative routes, though their capacity is significantly smaller. For some countries in the region, however, maritime transport remains the only viable export channel.

Q: The broader economic and political impact of the war on the region is a separate and complex issue. However, the current dynamics reinforce the view that regime change in Iran is unlikely to emerge as a direct outcome of the conflict. Such transformations typically require a much longer timeframe and are more likely to unfold in a postwar environment.

One development that has raised particular concern among analysts is the reported attempt by Donald Trump to engage Kurdish political leaders.

A: These reports have been independently confirmed. Yet Kurdish actors have strong reasons for caution, shaped by their experience in recent regional conflicts — most notably in Syria.

Despite the ongoing challenges, efforts by Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to stabilize the country have demonstrated that political compromises between Kurdish and Arab communities are at least possible under certain conditions. In Iran, however, such a convergence of interests is currently absent.

Historical memory also plays an important role. During the Iran–Iraq War, Iranian Kurdish populations experienced significant repression from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. As a result, any discussion of Kurdish units potentially entering Iran from neighboring Iraq immediately raises concerns about the safety of the civilian population.

In such a scenario, civilians could be perceived by IRGC as a potential support base for insurgents, exposing them to retaliatory measures. Without credible guarantees for the protection of these communities, Kurdish forces are unlikely to undertake such an operation. For this reason, many observers view current discussions of this option as highly speculative. In practice, these ideas resemble preliminary scenarios that might shape the political agenda only if Iran were eventually to lose the war.

Another important dimension of the conflict concerns the internal resilience — or fragility — of Iran’s political system. Much attention has focused on developments within the ruling elite following the elevation of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Ali Khamenei, to the position of supreme leader. Such a transition runs counter to many of the ideological principles and political traditions on which the Islamic Republic has formally rested.

At the same time, observers are closely watching the potential emergence of tensions between Mojtaba Khamenei and Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s National Security Council. Larijani had spent a period on the margins of political life but regained influence during the protests of December–January, when he once again moved closer to Ali Khamenei’s inner circle. Reports suggest that Larijani had hoped to see his own brother assume the position of supreme leader, a bid that ultimately failed. Many analysts believe this rivalry could deepen existing fractures within Iran’s ruling elite.

Equally important is Iran’s economic capacity to sustain a prolonged conflict. The protests that erupted in December and January were partly triggered by a severe crisis in the country’s banking system, which has shown little sign of recovery since then. Under the pressure of war and sanctions, financial instability could intensify. Should banks begin to fail, the consequences would extend far beyond the financial sector, affecting state finances, military funding, and the livelihoods of millions of Iranians.

Government statements already suggest that the authorities may struggle to pay the traditional bonuses and salary supplements that citizens normally receive during Nowruz. Such signals highlight the growing fiscal strain on the state.

Food security represents another emerging vulnerability. Disruptions to supply chains and logistics could quickly produce shortages, particularly in large urban centers. If transportation networks remain unstable, major cities risk becoming effectively cut off from essential supplies.

Q: Yes, there are factors that are not immediately visible, but that does not mean they disappear. The struggle for power within the country also continues. And, as in any country at war, the economic situation in Iran is not improving. All of these pressures will continue to accumulate.  

Yet the war’s economic and political repercussions are not confined to Iran alone. Countries across the Persian Gulf are also facing mounting pressures. The region’s economies are highly dependent on imports, and the disruption of shipping routes has already begun to affect logistics, tourism, and trade flows. Visitor numbers have declined sharply, further undermining service sectors that had only recently recovered from earlier shocks.

All of these challenges are closely tied to one critical factor: the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. This raises a fundamental question for policymakers and military planners alike — why can this problem not simply be resolved through military means?

A: Whether the issue can ultimately be resolved by military means remains uncertain. A significant degree of maritime security could likely be restored through military action, but only at considerable cost and with substantial effort. The challenge is not limited to operational tasks that the United States Navy might undertake. It also involves the calculations of major commercial actors: are shipping companies and energy firms prepared to risk their assets based solely on U.S. security guarantees?

For decades, a tacit arrangement shaped the region’s security architecture: Arab states paid substantial sums for protection, and Washington was expected to ensure stability in return. Today, that model is being tested. It would be inaccurate to describe the situation as a complete failure. Interception rates for incoming threats have been relatively high, and air defense systems deployed across the Persian Gulf — supported by both American and Israeli capabilities — have demonstrated significant effectiveness. Yet the inability to intercept every drone or missile continues to exert considerable pressure on regional security.

Ukraine has unexpectedly become part of this equation. As regional governments seek solutions to the growing threat posed by Shahed drones, Ukrainian experience in countering such systems has attracted attention. From Ukraine’s perspective, the optimal scenario would have been a short conflict culminating in the rapid collapse of the Iranian regime. That outcome has clearly not materialized.

As the conflict continues, the economic and strategic costs will rise. Defense expenditures are increasing, including spending on systems such as the MIM-104 Patriot missile defense system. Rising global oil prices also create negative consequences for Ukraine, contributing to inflation both domestically and internationally.

Market reactions remain highly sensitive to political signals, particularly statements from Donald Trump. At present, financial markets appear skeptical that the United States can rapidly reopen the Strait of Hormuz. For Ukraine, prolonged disruption carries clear risks: higher energy prices increase inflationary pressure worldwide, potentially fueling political dissatisfaction across Europe. Such conditions could strengthen right-wing populist movements seeking to capitalize on economic instability.

Historically, conflicts in the Middle East often shifted international attention away from Ukraine. In this case, however, the situation has developed differently. Ukraine’s experience with drone warfare has created a limited but real opportunity for cooperation with regional partners. At least for now, Ukrainian expertise has helped ensure that Kyiv remains relevant to the evolving security landscape.

There is also a broader strategic lesson. Earlier U.S. reluctance to pursue joint production of interceptor drones with Ukraine may now appear to have been a missed opportunity. The current situation has created a small but meaningful window for Ukraine to expand cooperation with states in the region, strengthening its diplomatic and security partnerships.

Q: Several conclusions nevertheless remain clear. The war is ongoing, its objectives continue to evolve, and the global oil market has been stabilized only through extraordinary measures whose durability is uncertain. Much now depends on whether maritime traffic can be safely restored through the Strait of Hormuz — either through military action or through a more effective deployment of American naval power.

Without reopening this critical shipping corridor, it will be difficult to speak not only of a broader geopolitical settlement but even of the type of postwar Iran envisioned by Donald Trump.

The diplomatic calendar adds another layer of pressure. Trump is expected to visit the People's Republic of China on March 31, and the war was initially expected to conclude within roughly four weeks. For the White House, there is therefore a clear incentive to demonstrate tangible progress before that meeting takes place.

A: At the same time, other actors are closely watching the situation. Russia, in particular, is likely to seek ways to influence developments and exploit the strategic uncertainty created by the conflict.

Q: Thank you for the conversation.

Ihor Dolhov led this conversation

Photo: Kyrylo Chubotin / Ukrinform