The Iran War, Prices, and Elections
What do Americans think about the U.S. operation against the ayatollah regime?
Twelve days have passed since the United States and Israel launched a military campaign against Iran, beginning on the last day of winter with large-scale strikes on military facilities. From the outset, the operation was framed as an effort to halt Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs and curb its regional influence. What has been achieved so far—and how do American citizens and analysts view the campaign?
A REGIONAL WAR WITH GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS
In this short period, the allies have carried out thousands of strikes across the territory of the Islamic Republic. The primary targets have included military bases, infrastructure belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, which many countries designate as a terrorist organization), and naval facilities.
Reports indicate that the Iranian navy fleet has been effectively neutralized, with most of its ships either sunk or rendered inoperable.
Ali Khamenei
The opening days of the war were also marked by the elimination of several high-ranking officials, including Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
Despite this, the rapid political collapse that many had predicted in Iran has not occurred. State institutions continue to function, and the slain rahbar has been succeeded by his son, Mojtaba Khamenei.
Mojtaba Khamenei
Analysts note that Tehran had prepared in advance for a scenario involving the loss of centralized command. Within the military structure, a multi-tier succession system had been introduced, allowing commanders who are killed to be quickly replaced and enabling units to maintain operational control. At the same time, military units were reportedly given instructions on how to act if communication with the central leadership were lost.
Iran responded to the U.S.–Israeli operation with large-scale attacks. Over a ten-day period, it launched roughly one thousand ballistic missiles and about two thousand drones.
The strikes targeted not only Israel but also U.S. bases and infrastructure across the region. Facilities in Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia came under attack. Shelling was also reported in Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Cyprus.
Iran’s network of proxy forces soon joined the hostilities. Lebanese Hezbollah militants began launching attacks on Israel. In response, the Israeli army announced a ground operation in southern Lebanon aimed at establishing a buffer security zone up to the Litani River.
The escalation has rattled global energy markets. The threat of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—through which more than one-fifth of the world’s oil exports pass—along with attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, triggered a sharp surge in prices.
Strait of Hormuz
Within days, Brent crude futures rose above $100 per barrel. The spike in oil prices quickly translated into higher fuel costs in many countries. In the United States, average gasoline prices jumped by 17–20 percent, rising from about $2.80 to $3.30 per gallon (roughly from 31 to 37 UAH per liter).
According to Western sources, Tehran’s strategy is not to confront the United States directly on the battlefield but to exhaust its opponent while destabilizing the global energy market. To this end, Iran has focused on strikes against energy infrastructure, transportation routes, and facilities linked to oil supplies.
ATTITUDES OF ORDINARY AMERICANS
Public opinion surveys in the United States suggest that Americans are far from enthusiastic about the military campaign in Iran.
According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll, about 43 percent of respondents disapprove of the strikes on Iran, while roughly 27 percent support them. Another third say they have not yet formed an opinion.
A separate CNN survey found that 59 percent of Americans oppose the decision to attack Iran, while 41 percent support it.
Attitudes also differ sharply along political lines. Support for military action is significantly higher among Republicans, while most Democrats—as well as many independent voters—remain skeptical.
Even among those who back the airstrikes, however, few support deploying American ground forces. According to CNN, only about 12 percent of respondents approve of the possibility of a ground operation.
Despite the scale of the fighting and triumphant rhetoric from both sides, neither has yet achieved a decisive strategic breakthrough. The war has already disrupted global energy markets and raised the risk of broader escalation.
Ukrinform correspondent in New York spoke with several American analysts to gauge how they assess the conflict and its possible trajectory. Unsurprisingly, their views largely reflect their political perspectives.
A PATH TO DEMOCRATIZATION?
According to Don Ritter, a longtime supporter of Ukraine, an “old-school” Republican, and a former congressman from Pennsylvania, the fall of Iran’s Islamist regime would carry major geopolitical consequences and would represent a significant defeat for Russia and Vladimir Putin—“especially given Iran’s involvement in the production of Shahed drones and the supply of related components.”
Don Ritter
In his view, political change in Iran would have repercussions far beyond the Middle East and could also affect China, which supplies Russia with “industrial goods, including key dual-use equipment that can be used for military purposes.”
Ritter argues that change in Iran could open new opportunities for democratic forces and potentially reorient the country toward the West—an outcome that would have strategic implications for the security and economic stability of both the region and the wider world. At the same time, Donald Trump has said he is not seeking the country’s democratization but rather loyalty from its new leadership.
A STRATEGIC MISTAKE?
John Hoffman, a research fellow on defense and foreign policy at the CATO Institute and a specialist in U.S. Middle East policy, believes President Donald Trump’s decision to attack Iran was a strategic error that risks triggering yet another crisis in the region.
John Hoffman
In his view, “there is no evidence that Iran was close to developing a nuclear weapon,” despite repeated claims by Iranian officials suggesting otherwise.
Hoffman notes that even some Republican hardliners have acknowledged this. In his assessment, “there was no imminent threat that would justify this war.”
If Trump had genuinely been focused on nuclear non-proliferation, Hoffman argues, “there would have been a deal on the table objectively better than the JCPOA (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed in 2015 to limit Iran’s nuclear program).” Instead, he says, the president “appears more interested in listening to hawks in Washington and Israel who for more than three decades have advocated U.S.-led regime change in Iran.”
The analyst strongly criticized Washington’s military operation. “Trump’s decision to bomb Iran is a strategically misguided show of force with no endgame in view,” he said.
According to Hoffman, “vague objectives, inflated perceptions of the threat, and fantasies about regime change risk dragging the United States into a long war that Americans do not want.”
In his view, “the United States is hurtling toward yet another Middle East crisis—one it has itself provoked.”
This perspective overlaps with that of some radical figures within the MAGA movement, who accuse Trump of abandoning the “America First” approach and the Monroe Doctrine by intervening in conflicts far from the United States.
WILL IT ALL END IN A WEEK OR TWO?
Lincoln Mitchell, a political scientist at Columbia University in New York, is also highly critical of Trump’s operation.
Lincoln Mitchell
“On the one hand, the Iranian regime created problems, issued threats, killed Americans, sponsored terrorism, and posed a threat to Israel,” the expert noted. “But it was also brutal toward its own people.”
Mitchell added that parts of the political left sometimes overlook the extent of the regime’s repression. According to reports, 30,000–35,000 protesters were killed in Iran this year alone—“roughly half the number of civilians killed in Gaza during the entire war,” he said.
“So I’m not shedding tears over Khamenei’s death or the possible end of this regime,” Mitchell stressed. “But it is far from obvious that the regime is actually finished. This regime has not been defeated.”
“At the same time, these are bad people doing bad things—but that does not mean this is the right way to conduct foreign policy,” he added, assessing the U.S. operation. “There is no plan, no strategy, no consultation with allies, and no clear understanding of what will happen tomorrow or the day after.”
In other words, he argues, there is no clear concept of how the war might end.
Mitchell believes there are “many, many ways” the campaign could end badly—from strengthening the regime, which could become even more repressive, to prolonged bombing that damages not only military targets but also critical civilian infrastructure. In the long run, this could lead to far greater civilian casualties.
Such a scenario could also trigger secondary crises: the spread of disease, deepening poverty, and state failure—conditions that could ultimately fuel more terrorism.
Another risk, Mitchell warns, is that the United States could become trapped in yet another endless war. He also noted that the dismantling of USAID has reduced Washington’s ability to influence developments in the region through soft power.
“It’s hard to imagine this ending well,” the political scientist said. “Of course, sometimes good things happen and opportunities emerge—but I don’t see that happening here.”
Meanwhile, Iran continues to strike targets across the region—something Mitchell says was entirely predictable. A third world war may not be inevitable, he added, “but this is already a major regional war, and it could grow even larger.”
Asked how the conflict might affect this year’s congressional elections, Mitchell said it is still too early to draw conclusions, since about eight months remain before the midterms.
“I think it is very likely that the United States will continue attacking Iran for another week or two and then stop,” Mitchell said. “After that, whatever happens in Iran—and I don’t expect anything positive—the United States will no longer be directly involved.” In that case, he believes, the issue will quickly fade from the headlines and public debate will shift to other topics. If that happens, the conflict is unlikely to have a major impact on the midterm elections.
However, if the war escalates—especially if the United States deploys ground troops in Iran—“it will be terrible for the Republicans,” the analyst said, despite the fact that “all of Trump’s efforts are aimed at securing victory in these elections.”
At the same time, Mitchell argues that the conflict will inevitably affect the economy, “which will be very bad for the Republicans.” Inflation could rise, he noted, because China receives a substantial share of its energy from Iranian fossil fuels. If the Strait of Hormuz were closed, “China would have to obtain energy from other sources—most likely Russia—which would drive prices up and make everything more expensive.”
Stock markets would also come under pressure.
“So this will have a significant impact,” the expert concluded. “For Trump, it is quite bad.” In Mitchell’s view, the threat of war and the rhetoric of confrontation had worked in the U.S. president’s favor politically. “But once he actually started the conflict,” that advantage largely disappeared.
“And what is the overall attitude of Americans toward this conflict?” I asked the political scientist.
According to Mitchell, many on the political left oppose it almost instinctively simply because Trump initiated it. In addition, Americans have seen similar wars before—most notably in Iraq—and older generations still remember Vietnam.
More conservative voters—“particularly many Jewish Americans”—tend to focus strongly on Israel’s security and believe the campaign strengthens it. “But bombs are falling on Israel, so how exactly is that making the country safer?” he asked.
Overall, Mitchell says he sees little enthusiasm for the war among the American public. Compared with both Iraq wars and other military campaigns, “people are not excited about this conflict—even those who are ideologically on the right and generally support Trump.”
He recently visited Florida, where support for conservative politics is significantly stronger than in New York. “I didn’t see people talking about the war or getting excited about it,” he said. According to Mitchell, only media outlets aligned with the Republican Party are trying to present the military operation in Iran in an upbeat tone.
“I don’t hear people saying, ‘We’re really giving Iran a beating,’” he added. “And I don’t see the kind of personal hatred toward Khamenei—who was undoubtedly a terrible person—that existed toward someone like Saddam Hussein.”
Part of the reason, Mitchell believes, is that the administration has not sufficiently explained to the American public the actions and policies of the Iranian regime’s leader.
As a result, there has been no so-called “rally-around-the-flag” effect. The assumption had been that once the United States entered the war, the president’s popularity would rise as citizens rallied behind a national cause. “Instead, I see a lot of negativity,” he said.
Many Americans are also concerned that Trump is losing focus on what they see as the country’s most pressing issue: the economy. “American voters are worried about economic conditions,” Mitchell noted. “He is getting involved in conflicts around the world while food prices for ordinary people continue to rise.”
A similar dynamic occurred in 1992, when it had widely been assumed that George H. W. Bush would win reelection comfortably, yet Bill Clinton ultimately prevailed. At the time, critics argued that “Bush cared more about Iraq than about America.” Mitchell says similar sentiments are beginning to appear again—particularly among independent voters who previously supported Trump.
“Food prices have really gone up,” he added. “Fortunately, I can afford it. But if I didn’t have a good family income, I would definitely feel the pressure.”
Volodymyr Ilchenko, New York
Photos via the White House, Author’s personal archive, screenshots from YouTube videos, and U.S. Air Force
(Quotations from U.S. expert comments are given here translated from Ukrainian)