Electronic Warfare: The Invisible Shield of the Right Kind of Noise

Have you ever been listening to the radio when the signal suddenly drops, the airwaves dissolve into static, and you begin searching for another frequency? Or driving with GPS when an air raid alert sounds — and instead of Zaporizhzhia, your navigator inexplicably reroutes you to… Peru?

On the frontline, the same principle applies. Only there, it is enemy drones searching for a “signal,” while precision-guided glide bombs (KABs) calculate their “routes” to populated areas. Electronic warfare (EW) units create deliberate “noise,” disrupting navigation and severing the connection between hostile hardware and its operator.

Over four years of full-scale war, this is our first time working alongside an electronic warfare unit. The EW company commander from the 260th Territorial Defense Brigade “Khortytsia,” call sign “Monkey,” says attitudes toward EW began shifting only about a year ago.

Call sign “Monkey”, Electronic warfare (EW) company commander, 260th Territorial Defense Brigade “Khortytsia”

“This field was underestimated. Priority was given to UAVs. And very few people wanted — or still want — to serve in electronic warfare units.”

Because EW is complicated? — I ask.

“At first, yes. But the more you work with it, the more you understand it,” he replies.

In civilian life, he was a design engineer at one of Ukroboronprom’s enterprises. He joined the military in 2024 and was offered training in three interconnected areas: electronic intelligence (ELINT), electronic warfare (EW), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

As larger drones continue to develop, he notes, EW systems may eventually be mounted on them — but that lies ahead. For now, the units operate a range of ground-based communications-jamming systems.

A UMPC module from an aerial bomb that fell under the influence of electronic warfare

One of them is the Bukovel-PP, a domestically produced technology. Compact and relatively easy to camouflage, it can suppress radio signals within a radius of up to five kilometers and is suitable for protecting populated areas. The more such systems are deployed, the better, “Monkey” says.

“There is a command post monitoring the airspace. Once an aerial object is detected, the duty officer at the command-and-observation post is ordered to suppress it. ELINT provides the target coordinates — frequencies and bandwidth. From the available EW assets, the most suitable system is selected.”

Ukrainian servicemen near a UMPC module from an aerial bomb that fell under the influence of electronic warfare

At the outset of the invasion, most drones operated on similar frequencies, allowing EW units to create what was effectively a “dead zone.” Now, drone operators constantly shift frequencies, making detection — and suppression — far more complex.

“They sense when our EW is active and switch to another frequency. Our job is to identify that new channel and jam it. That’s where electronic intelligence comes in.”

— I’ve read that EW without ELINT is just a formality. Is that accurate?

“It is. You can activate EW blindly, but it won’t be effective.”

— Artillery knows it has succeeded when the target is destroyed. How do you measure your effectiveness?

“That’s one of the biggest challenges. Our work is invisible. We can’t state with certainty that a KAB or a Shahed drone failed to reach its target because of us. There’s no direct confirmation, although sometimes video interceptions offer clues. But if drones are guided via fiber-optic cable, EW is powerless. They fly — and they can’t be jammed.”

He admits that, more often than not, no one thanks them for their work.

Ukrainian servicemen near a downed Molniya drone

LEADING THE ENEMY “TO AFRICA”

According to “Monkey,” the enemy’s electronic warfare capabilities are not merely strong — they are several times more powerful. Russia has invested in this field for years, deploying long-range systems capable of operating at distances up to 45 kilometers and suppressing communications within a 60–80 kilometer radius.

— So how do you win this EW battle? — I ask.

“By focusing on medium-range systems. They’re relatively affordable — about UAH 400,000. Our task is to create interference so the enemy operator can’t control frequencies and signals. The more EW assets we deploy, the more bands we can cover. Coordination with adjacent units is crucial — we need to agree on who suppresses which frequency. And we must remember: it’s not only enemy drones in the sky. Ours are there too.”

He outlines two main methods of suppression: noise jamming and command spoofing.

Noise jamming works like the earlier radio example — you try to tune in, but all you hear is static. A drone attempts to receive commands from its controller, but the EW-generated interference blocks the signal.

“The second method is what we might call smart suppression or command spoofing. The EW system sends a false command to the drone. If it works, the drone is paralyzed — it may enter a spin or crash. Spoofing coordinates means disrupting navigation. The drone ‘thinks’ it’s suddenly somewhere else — say, in Africa — and begins recalculating its route.”

A glide bomb that failed to reach its target due to EW interference

AN INVISIBLE SHIELD

— If not for EW, what would a city like Zaporizhzhia look like today? Monitoring channels frequently report guided glide bombs heading toward the city, yet many fall short. Is that your work?

“Yes. Without us, far more KABs would reach the city. The destruction would be immense. EW does an enormous amount of work. We are a shield, not a sword.”

During assault operations, when the enemy begins dismantling Ukrainian positions, infantry units radio urgently: “Turn on suppression!” — preventing the adversary from effectively coordinating its forces.

“Our job is to provide cover. We support infantry, aviation, and everyone else.”

Electronic warfare specialists must, in a sense, infiltrate enemy communications just as assault troops storm enemy positions. The field urgently needs design engineers. Breakthrough technological solutions could shift the balance in this technological and drone-driven war.

EW soldiers understand they are a shield — even if invisible. They know that every enemy aircraft or drone lost is, in part, the result of their work. And that defending populated areas “in silence” would be far harder.

To win on the battlefield, you need the right kind of noise.

Olha Zvonaryova, Zaporizhzhia

Photos by Dmytro Smolienko / Ukrinform