January’s attrition of Russia’s Air Defense Hardware
Counting high-value Russian losses for January
January 2026 opened with a particularly costly stretch for Russia’s high-end military equipment — especially its air-defense architecture. From the first days of the month through its final week, Russian air-defense units absorbed sustained, visible losses across multiple sectors.
Ukrinform has compiled some of the most illustrative examples of how Ukraine’s Defense Forces have been systematically degrading Moscow’s much-advertised radar and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems — helping them, as Ukrainian soldiers put it, “exit the chat” during the opening three weeks of the new year.
Tor-M2 surface-to-air missile system
January 2026 opened with the destruction of yet another piece of Russia’s much-touted “no-analogues” arsenal. The first system to be knocked out was a Tor-M2 surface-to-air missile system. Despite bearing the name of the Norse god of thunder, the system offered little protection to its operators: on the very first day of the year it was reduced to scrap metal near the settlement of Shevchenko in Ukraine’s Donetsk region.
The next confirmed strike followed on January 5 in the area of Novoyanysol, located in currently occupied Donetsk Oblast. Fighters from Ukraine’s 412th “Nemesis” Brigade targeted a key element of a S-300V system — the 9S32 engagement radar.
The destroyed 9S32 radar served as the fire-control and guidance backbone of the battery, capable of simultaneously directing up to 12 interceptor missiles against six separate targets. Its loss effectively blinded the system and rendered the entire complex combat-ineffective.
For a platform designed to defend against high-speed aerial threats, the irony was stark: this time, the system failed to protect itself.
Buk-M3 surface-to-air missile system
On January 11, Ukraine’s General Staff reported the successful fire strike against a launcher of the Buk-M3 surface-to-air missile system.
The strike was recorded near the settlement of Baranycheve in the Luhansk region.
The Buk-M3 represents one of Russia’s more modern medium-range air defense platforms, designed to engage aerodynamic targets, cruise missiles, and certain ballistic threats. The destruction of a launcher not only reduces the battery’s immediate engagement capacity but also disrupts its layered air-defense architecture, which relies on coordinated interaction between radar assets, command
Prima P-18-2 radar system
Over the following day, on the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk axes, operators from the Nemesis UAV unit once again demonstrated precision long-range strike capabilities. Using so-called “middle strike” assets, they neutralized three high-value Russian air defense systems in rapid succession: the P-18 radar (in its modernized “Prima P-18-2” configuration), the Tor missile system, and the Tunguska self-propelled anti-aircraft system.
The loss of these assets is operationally significant. The P-18 radar provides early warning and target acquisition, forming part of the detection layer of Russia’s integrated air defense network. The Tor system is designed for short-range interception of precision-guided munitions and UAVs, while the Tunguska combines autocannons and missiles to protect maneuver units against low-altitude aerial threats.
Striking such systems in a single operational window not only degrades local air defense density but also creates temporary gaps in Russia’s protective umbrella, increasing the vulnerability of logistics hubs, artillery positions, and rear-area infrastructure.
2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 "Grison") tracked self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and missile system
The P-18 radar (Prima P-18-2 variant) was reportedly destroyed near Lozuvatka, while a Tunguska system was eliminated in the vicinity of Pidspirya in the currently occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region. A Tor missile system system was also neutralized near Soniashne in Donetsk region.
The tempo of losses intensified further. On January 14, Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported the destruction of six additional Russian air defense systems and radars within a 48-hour window.
According to the announcement, the affected assets included:
A Tor missile system and a S-350 Vityaz (50N6E radar component), destroyed in Mariupol district, Donetsk region;
Buk missile system, Tor-M2, and Strela-10 systems in Polohy district, Zaporizhzhia region;
A Buk-M1 near Volnovakha, Donetsk region.
Operationally, this concentration of strikes against layered air defense assets—ranging from short-range point defense to medium-range systems—suggests a deliberate campaign to erode Russia’s integrated air defense network (IADS) in southern and eastern Ukraine. The cumulative degradation of radar coverage and missile batteries increases exposure of logistics nodes, command posts, and rear-area infrastructure to precision strike systems and unmanned platforms.
Among the most consequential losses in this series of strikes was the destruction of the 50N6E multifunction radar, the core sensor and fire-control component of the S-350 Vityaz.
The 50N6E radar effectively serves as the “eyes and brain” of the S-350 battery. Designed as a modernized replacement for older Soviet-era systems, it integrates target detection, tracking, and missile guidance within a single command architecture. According to open-source specifications, the radar is capable of simultaneously detecting and tracking up to 40 aerodynamic targets and up to 12 ballistic targets, while providing engagement guidance for multiple interceptors in parallel.
Operationally, the loss of a 50N6E radar is more than the destruction of a single vehicle. Without it, the S-350 battery is effectively blind and unable to conduct coordinated engagements. Even if launchers and interceptors remain intact, the absence of the radar degrades the system to a non-operational state until replaced or integrated into another functioning fire-control network.
In the broader context of the campaign against Russian integrated air defenses, eliminating high-value sensor nodes such as the 50N6E produces disproportionate effects. Modern air defense is network-centric: radar coverage, data fusion, and fire-control connectivity are what enable layered protection. Once those nodes are disrupted, gaps emerge in coverage, reaction times increase, and the survivability of other assets in the defended area declines sharply.
For Ukraine, such strikes do not merely reduce the number of interceptors available to Russian forces—they undermine the coherence of the entire air defense architecture in the affected sector.Початок форми
Vityaz 50N6E multifunctional radar
While the exact procurement cost of the 50N6E radar has not been officially disclosed, open-source estimates suggest that a single unit may exceed $5 million, depending on configuration and associated command components. Given its central role within the S-350 Vityaz architecture, its operational value far surpasses the platform’s standalone price tag.
Another high-value radar asset was reportedly struck on January 17 near Yevpatoria in temporarily occupied Crimea: the Nebo-U.
Pantsir-S1 short- to medium-range air defense system
The Nebo-U (55Zh6U) is a VHF-band, long-range early-warning radar designed to detect aerodynamic and certain stealth-optimized targets at extended ranges. Operating in lower frequency bands, it complements higher-frequency engagement radars by improving detection probability against low-observable aircraft. Its destruction degrades wide-area situational awareness and reduces early-warning timelines for Russian forces in Crimea and the broader Black Sea region.
On the same day, Ukrainian forces reportedly neutralized a Pantsir-S1 near Khutorka on the occupied peninsula.
The Pantsir-S1 is a short- to medium-range air defense system combining surface-to-air missiles with twin 30mm autocannons. It is typically tasked with point defense of strategic assets, including long-range SAM batteries such as S-300 and S-400 systems. In layered air defense doctrine, Pantsir units provide the final protective ring against cruise missiles, UAVs, and precision-guided munitions.
Operationally, the simultaneous degradation of long-range surveillance (Nebo-U), fire-control nodes (50N6E), and short-range point defense (Pantsir-S1) indicates a systematic effort to erode the integrity of Russia’s integrated air defense network in Crimea. Rather than isolated tactical strikes, such actions suggest targeting logic aimed at disassembling the layered architecture—sensor, shooter, and close-in shield—thereby increasing vulnerability across the entire defensive grid.
As previously noted in earlier assessments of high-value Russian losses, the long-range 55Zh6U radar system — Nebo-U — is widely estimated to cost around $100 million per unit. Beyond its monetary value, the system plays a strategic role within Russia’s integrated air defense network, providing extended-range detection and early warning that feeds targeting data to layered SAM batteries.
January’s attrition, however, was not limited to domestically produced Russian equipment. Assets imported from North Korea were also struck.
On January 19, in the Luhansk sector, Ukrainian UAV strikes reportedly targeted not only a 9A84 transporter-erector-loader (TEL) associated with the S-300V, but also a North Korean M-1991 240mm multiple launch rocket system.
The M-1991 MLRS, developed by North Korea, is designed for high-volume saturation fire at extended ranges and typically employs 240mm rockets capable of striking area targets, logistics hubs, and fortified positions. Its appearance on the battlefield underscores deepening military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.
The 9A84 TEL is a critical logistical and reloading component of the S-300V family. Disabling such vehicles affects not only immediate missile availability but also the system’s sustained engagement capacity. In modern high-tempo air campaigns, reload and mobility assets are as operationally decisive as launchers and radars themselves.
Taken together, the strikes reflect a broader pattern: targeting not merely frontline combat platforms, but the connective tissue of Russia’s air defense and fire-support architecture — including foreign-supplied systems intended to compensate for domestic losses.
Long-range 55Zh6U Nebo-U radar system
Based on comparative assessments with analogous systems — such as the Soviet-era BM-27 Uragan — the estimated value of the North Korean M-1991 MLRS, including a standard ammunition package, likely falls within the $1.5–2.5 million range. While considerably cheaper than high-end air defense systems, such platforms remain tactically significant due to their area-saturation capability and ability to shape the battlefield in support of maneuver units.
On January 20, Ukrainian forces reported the successful strike on a relatively rare Russian electronic warfare (EW) system, the Borisoglebsk-2, in the Vovchansk sector. The target was identified and engaged by the 429th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade “Achilles.”
The Borisoglebsk-2 (RB-301B) is a multi-vehicle EW complex mounted on tracked chassis, designed to conduct radio-electronic suppression of tactical communications, satellite signals, and UAV control links. It plays a critical role in degrading an adversary’s C4ISR architecture and protecting Russian maneuver elements from drone-enabled targeting.
According to available reporting, the system was struck with multiple munitions, and follow-on fire prevented Russian forces from evacuating the damaged equipment. From an operational perspective, the destruction of such an EW asset carries outsized consequences: beyond material loss, it reduces Russia’s ability to contest the electromagnetic spectrum — an increasingly decisive domain in this conflict.
The cumulative pattern is notable. January’s attrition did not focus solely on kinetic platforms but extended into enabling systems — radars, reload vehicles, and electronic warfare complexes — that underpin Russia’s layered air defense and battlefield management ecosystem.
M-1991 MLRS
The RB-301B Borisoglebsk-2 automated electronic suppression complex is assessed to cost approximately $200 million for a full system set. A complete configuration includes the R-300KMV command post vehicle and up to nine specialized EW platforms — such as the R-934BMV jamming stations — mounted on MT-LB tracked chassis and equipped with differentiated radio-electronic payloads.
The system is widely regarded as one of the most valuable high-priority targets in Russia’s tactical order of battle. Designed for multi-domain electromagnetic suppression, it can reportedly execute up to 30 concurrent electronic warfare tasks, including:
Disruption of satellite navigation signals (GPS)
Suppression of radio-navigation systems
Jamming of UAV command-and-control links
Interference with tactical communications networks
Since the start of the full-scale invasion, 15 confirmed strikes against Borisoglebsk-2 elements have been recorded — a notable attrition rate for a system deployed in limited numbers and considered integral to Russia’s electronic warfare doctrine.
RB-301B Borisoglebsk-2 automated EW system
In the final ten days of January, Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea sustained additional losses.
Near Yevpatoria, Ukrainian forces struck the long-range surveillance radar 55Zh6 “Nebo-U” — a VHF-band system designed for early detection of stealth aircraft and high-altitude targets.
The Nebo-U is a strategic-level asset, forming part of Russia’s layered air defense architecture and contributing to target designation for S-300 and S-400 systems. Previous estimates have placed the unit cost of this radar at approximately $100 million.
In addition, in the vicinity of Frunze, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Podlyot radar, a low-altitude target acquisition system designed to detect cruise missiles, UAVs, and other low-flying threats that can evade longer-range radar envelopes.
The degradation of both long-range early warning and low-altitude detection systems in Crimea represents more than material losses. It directly erodes Russia’s integrated air defense network (IADS) on the peninsula, increasing exposure to precision strikes and reducing early-warning timelines.
Taken together, January’s strikes demonstrate a sustained Ukrainian focus on dismantling not only frontline systems, but also the sensor and electronic backbone underpinning Russian air and electromagnetic superiority in the Black Sea theater.
Podlyot low-altitude target acquisition radar system
On the night of January 27, near the settlement of Kacha in temporarily occupied Crimea, units of Ukraine’s Defense Forces struck a Russian Tor-M2 short-range air defense system.
According to later reporting by Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), the target was likely the rare 9K332 Tor-M2DT — the so-called “Arctic” variant of the system.
The 9K332 Tor-M2DT is a highly specialized version of Russia’s short-range air defense system, engineered specifically for operations in the extreme environmental conditions of the High North. Mounted on the articulated DT-30PM Vityaz tracked chassis, the system is optimized for snow, tundra, and sub-zero climates where conventional wheeled or standard tracked platforms struggle.
Key characteristics typically attributed to the Tor-M2DT include:
Engagement of aerodynamic targets at short-to-medium ranges (including UAVs, cruise missiles, and fixed-wing aircraft)
High mobility across Arctic terrain
Autonomous radar detection and fire-control capability
Integration into layered Russian air defense architecture
Moscow has marketed the Tor-M2DT as a “last line of defense” platform against drones, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft in harsh climatic environments — particularly to protect Arctic infrastructure and strategic assets.
9K332 Tor-M2DT air defense system (Arctic variant)
The Tor-M2DT Arctic variant is mounted on the articulated DT-30PM-T1 Vityaz tracked carrier, a two-section platform designed for extreme terrain mobility.
The chassis provides exceptional cross-country performance in deep snow, tundra, and marshland, and is fully amphibious. It is engineered to operate in temperatures down to –50°C, supported by specialized insulation and life-support systems for crew survivability in Arctic conditions.
Tor-M2DT Technical Parameters
Missile loadout: 16 vertically launched 9M338K surface-to-air missiles
Engagement range: approximately 1 to 15–16 km
Engagement altitude: 10 m to 10–12 km
Target detection: up to 45–48 aerial targets at distances up to 32 km
Simultaneous tracking: up to 10 targets
The standard Tor-M2 system is typically valued at $25–27 million per unit. The Arctic Tor-M2DT variant is considered significantly more expensive and comparatively scarce due to the complexity and cost of the Vityaz articulated platform.
Additional High-Value Air Defense Losses in January
In January, Ukrainian military intelligence units also reported successful strikes against:
Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense system
Tor-M1 and Tor-M2, including a transporter-loader vehicle
Nebo-M radar component (RLM-ME meter-band module)
Protivnik-GE radar
The RLM-ME is the export version of the meter-band radar module integrated into the 55Zh6M Nebo-M mobile radar complex. It represents one of the most critical and resource-intensive components of Russia’s modern air defense sensor architecture.
Key characteristics:
Three-coordinate radar with active electronically scanned array (AESA)
Designed to detect and track a wide spectrum of aerial targets, including:
Conventional aircraft
Low-observable (“stealth”) platforms
Cruise missiles
Ballistic targets
High mobility and modular deployment capability
The RLM-ME (and its domestic RLM-M counterpart) is widely regarded as one of the most technologically sophisticated and scarce radar assets within Russia’s air defense inventory. As a meter-band radar, it plays a vital role in counter-stealth detection and early warning within Russia’s layered integrated air defense system (IADS).
Operational Implications
The systematic degradation of short-range systems (Tor, Pantsir) combined with the attrition of high-value radar assets (Nebo-M components, Protivnik-GE) directly weakens the integrity of Russia’s layered air defense network.
Short-range SAM systems provide close-in protection for strategic radars and long-range launchers. Once these protective layers are removed, high-end radar nodes become more vulnerable to drone swarms, loitering munitions, and precision strikes.
The cumulative effect is not merely tactical loss, but progressive erosion of situational awareness, target acquisition, and engagement coordination across occupied territories — particularly in Crimea and southern operational sectors.
RLM-ME, part of the 55Zh6M Nebo-M radar complex
The module operates in the meter-band frequency range, which significantly enhances its ability to detect low-observable (stealth) targets. It is mounted on the BAZ-69096 (8×8) high-mobility chassis, and its deployment or teardown time is approximately 15 minutes, enabling rapid repositioning under combat conditions.
As part of the 55Zh6M Nebo-M radar complex, the RLM-ME module provides detection of aerial targets at ranges of up to 600 km and at altitudes reaching 600 km, covering both aerodynamic and certain ballistic trajectories.
55Zh6M Nebo-M Radar Complex
The estimated cost of a single 55Zh6M Nebo-M radar complex — which includes the RLM-ME module — exceeds $100 million.
According to available assessments:
Domestic Russian pricing may be around 1.5 billion rubles (lower than export pricing at current exchange rates).
Export variants (designated with the “E” index, such as RLM-ME) typically cost 2–2.5 times more than systems supplied for internal Russian use.
The high price reflects:
Advanced electronics
Active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology
Limited production runs
As of late 2024, Russian forces were estimated to operate approximately ten Nebo-M systems, underscoring their scarcity and strategic value.
Protivnik-GE (59N6-E) Radar
The Protivnik-GE (59N6-E) is a Russian mobile three-coordinate radar operating in the decimeter-band frequency range.
Its primary functions include:
Detection and tracking of a wide spectrum of aerial targets
Determination of target coordinates
Support for engagement by surface-to-air missile systems through target designation
The system is designed to detect:
Fixed-wing aircraft (including certain low-observable platforms)
Cruise missiles
Small-sized aerial objects
Within Russia’s layered integrated air defense architecture, Protivnik-GE serves as an intermediate-range surveillance and target acquisition radar, bridging early-warning assets and fire-control systems.
Operational Significance
The attrition of both meter-band systems such as Nebo-M and decimeter-band assets like Protivnik-GE has compounding effects. Meter-band radars contribute to counter-stealth detection and long-range early warning, while decimeter-band radars refine tracking and provide targeting data to SAM batteries.
The loss of such systems reduces:
Detection depth
Redundancy in radar coverage
Engagement coordination for long- and medium-range SAM systems
Given their limited numbers and high replacement costs, each confirmed strike represents not only a tactical success but a structural degradation of Russia’s air defense sensor network.
Decimeter-band Protivnik-GE radar
Among the key technical specifications and operational capabilities of the Protivnik-GE radar, the following stand out:
Detection range: up to 400–450 km
Altitude coverage: up to 200 km, allowing tracking of certain low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellites
Simultaneous tracking capacity: up to 150 targets (with upgraded variants reportedly capable of tracking over 1,000 objects)
Developers describe the system as both rare and highly effective, primarily because it provides wide-area airspace surveillance at extended distances and serves as a critical sensor node within integrated air defense networks.
The Protivnik-GE operates in the decimeter-wave band, enabling it to:
Detect aerodynamic targets at long range
Track cruise missiles and small-sized aerial objects
Provide target designation data to surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems
It plays a critical role in Russia’s layered air defense architecture by supplying early detection and mid-range tracking data to engagement systems.
The system is in service with the Russian Armed Forces and has also been exported — including to Egypt, reflecting its positioning as a commercially viable surveillance radar in the global defense market.
The price of a single Protivnik-GE station is estimated at approximately $5 million.
While not as expensive as strategic-level systems such as meter-band early-warning complexes, its operational value lies in:
Providing redundancy within radar coverage
Supporting SAM batteries with reliable targeting data
Extending situational awareness across large sectors of airspace
Given its limited numbers and role in maintaining continuous airspace control, the loss of such a system can create localized surveillance gaps and complicate air defense coordination.
9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) short-range mobile surface-to-air missile system
In the final days of the month, Russian forces lost three additional air defense assets.
On January 29, near the temporarily occupied settlement of Lymarivka in Luhansk region, Ukrainian forces struck the Nebo-SVU radar station. The estimated cost of this system is around $100 million.
1L119 Nebo-SVU Radar
The Nebo-SVU is a modernized VHF-band radar designed for long-range detection of aerodynamic and certain low-observable targets. Operating in the meter-wave spectrum, it is particularly valued for its ability to detect aircraft with reduced radar cross-sections. Within Russia’s layered air defense architecture, it functions as a long-range early warning and target acquisition system, cueing engagement platforms such as S-300 and S-400 variants.
The loss of a system in this class is significant not only in financial terms but also operationally, as VHF radars provide complementary coverage against stealth platforms that may be less visible to higher-frequency systems.
On January 30, near the settlement of Semenivka in the currently occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region, a direct hit was recorded on an Osa (NATO reporting name: SA-8 Gecko).
9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
The Osa is a Soviet-era, all-weather, short-range mobile surface-to-air missile system. Despite its age, it remains operationally relevant due to several enduring characteristics:
High mobility on a wheeled amphibious chassis
Autonomous combat capability, integrating radar detection, tracking, and missile launch functions within a single vehicle
Ability to engage low-flying aircraft and certain types of UAVs
While technologically outdated compared to modern systems, its autonomy and mobility allow it to serve as a point-defense asset for maneuver units and rear-area protection. Its continued use underscores Russia’s reliance on legacy systems to fill gaps in air defense coverage amid mounting battlefield losses.
Taken together, the late-month strikes against both advanced long-range radar assets and legacy short-range systems illustrate the ongoing degradation of Russia’s layered air defense network across occupied territories.
VHF-band Nebo-SVU radar
The month ended much the way it began — with the destruction of another Tor-M1 system.
In its Tor-M1 configuration, the much-touted Russian “analogov net” was eliminated in Luhansk region, near the settlement of Kamianka. Despite its name — inherited from the Norse god of thunder — the system once again failed to shield its operators from precision Ukrainian strikes.
Tor-M1 (9K331)
The Tor-M1 (9K331) is a short-range, all-weather surface-to-air missile system designed to intercept:
UAVs and loitering munitions
Cruise missiles
Precision-guided munitions
Tactical aircraft and helicopters
Key characteristics include:
Engagement range of up to 12 km (depending on missile variant)
Integrated radar and fire control system within a single tracked vehicle
High reaction time, optimized for point-defense of maneuver units and critical infrastructure
Although considered one of Russia’s more capable short-range air defense platforms, Tor systems have suffered repeated battlefield losses throughout the war. Their destruction not only reduces immediate tactical air defense coverage but also further strains Russia’s already depleted inventory of modern SHORAD assets.
The symbolic irony is difficult to ignore: yet another “Tor” neutralized on Ukrainian soil. For a system named after a Scandinavian thunder god, its battlefield performance in eastern Ukraine has proven far less mythical than advertised.
Ivan Stupak, Kyiv
Illustrative photos from publicly accessible sources