Andrii Turchyn, Colonel, Commander of the 25th Separate Sicheslav Airborne Brigade

Andrii Turchyn embarked on his military career well before 2014. He faced Russia’s full-scale invasion while serving as deputy chief of staff at a battalion tactical group. Today, Turchyn is a full recipient of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (all three classes). Under his command, the 25th Separate Sicheslav Air Assault Brigade is fighting on the Pokrovsk front. In late March 2024, the brigade carried out an operation near the village of Tonenke, inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces.

In an interview with Ukrinform, Andrii Turchyn spoke about how the Russo-Ukrainian war has evolved, the role of technology and people on the battlefield, and the true cost of command decisions.

DEPLOYED TO THE EAST IN MAY 2014

Q: Andrii Leonidovych, how did your path in the Armed Forces begin? Was it an earnest choice?

A: It wasn’t dictated by family tradition; there were no career military officers in my family. But after eighth grade I made a deliberate decision and enrolled in a military lyceum specializing in advanced military and physical training. That’s where I learned discipline and responsibility, and understood that the army is not about romance, but about daily, demanding work.

After the lyceum, I studied at the Odesa Institute of the Ground Forces, which was later relocated to Lviv. I completed my education there at what is now the National Army Academy. I graduated in 2009, at a time when Ukraine’s airmobile forces were being organized and formed. It was a period of transformation, ambition, and very high expectations.

Q: Your combat record spans virtually every phase of the modern Russia–Ukraine war. Where did it begin for you?

A: After graduating, I spent five years serving within a training battalion in Desna. In 2013, I transferred to the 80th Brigade. By 2014, we had formed a battalion tactical group, and on May 9 deployed to eastern Ukraine. We fought through Bilohorivka, Shypylivka, and Lysychansk, and were among the last units to withdraw from the city.

I met the full-scale invasion in the role of deputy chief of staff at a battalion tactical group. At the time, we were undergoing recovery and regrouping, first at the Yavoriv training area, then at Shyrokyi Lan in the Mykolaiv region. But the war upended those plans. Instead of scheduled training, we were immediately tasked with combat operations.

Q: What does the Air Assault Forces (DShV) mean to you today?

A: The Airborne and Air Assault Forces have always been—and remain—the elite. That’s not rhetoric. It means higher standards, more complex missions, and the need to make decisions in a matter of seconds. There is no margin for error. War is a competition of adaptation: whoever adapts faster, survives.

“MODERN COMBAT IS ABOUT CONTROL, TRACKING, INTERCEPTION, AND PRECISION”

Q: What is the key lesson of this war for the Ukrainian military?

A: There are no fixed solutions. The enemy is constantly changing tactics, frequencies, and operational approaches. We respond—and then adapt again. Electronic warfare systems, UAVs, interceptor drones, ground robotic platforms—all of it is in constant flux.

But the key factor is people. You can’t take someone who was driving a bus yesterday and place them, without training, into a complex, technology-intensive role. Motivation, understanding, and a willingness to grow are essential.

Q: How does today’s war differ from what is was in 2022?

A: Radically different. Previously, units could move in compact formations and advance rapidly right up to the forward line. Today, troops are forced to dismount 15–20 kilometers away. The constant aerial threat—FPV drones and enemy reconnaissance—means every movement has to be controlled.

Modern combat is about control, tracking, interception, and precision. Any mistake comes at an extremely high cost.

The war has become technological, but without man, any high-tech equipment is just a pile of metal.

A WAR OF ATTRITION

Q: What is most exhausting for Ukrainian soldiers currently fighting on the Pokrovsk front?

A: Psychological pressure and the enemy’s information influence campaign. When a servicemember sees fake reports on social media claiming that “Pokrovsk has fallen,” it creates additional tension. But the reality is a whole lot different: we are holding the line and eliminating the adversary on a daily basis.

Q: Has the enemy’s tactics changed during the fighting in this sector?

A: Not fundamentally. They have simply replaced heavy equipment with lighter platforms such as motorcycles, quad bikes, civilian vehicles. They have ample manpower and do not spare it.

Q: What have two years of fighting in this sector of the front demonstrated?

A: We are maturing every day, from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk. Offensive operations, defense, then adaptation again. This is a war of attrition—of both manpower and equipment. We are forced to continuously grow technologically: FPV drones, ground robotic systems, and unmanned logistics. Evacuation, resupply, and reconnaissance are increasingly shifting to unmanned formats.

Q: What does it mean to “hold the sector”?

A: First and foremost, it’s about people. Without them, there will be neither territory nor positions. Everything else follows from that: properly constructed defenses, situational awareness, firepower, and coordination.

50+ ENEMY VEHICLES DESTROYED IN A SINGLE DAY

Q: I’d like to discuss the operation near Tonenke, where the Sicheslav Brigade repelled a massive Russian mechanized assault. What led up to this operation?

A: It took place amid active offensive actions by the enemy, who deployed heavy armored equipment—tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and MT-LB armored carriers. Our units held advantageous positions on elevated terrain, which allowed us to detect enemy convoys early and build an effective engagement system.

The key factor was the integrated use of anti-tank weapons and unmanned systems. Our troops employed Javelin and Stugna anti-tank guided missile systems, as well as FPV drones—for both reconnaissance and delivering strikes at hostile equipment and personnel.

Q: What did this operation end up with?

A: In just a single day of fighting, we destroyed more than 50 pieces of enemy equipment. Overall, the enemy’s losses exceeded 90 units of armored vehicles and other heavy equipment, which significantly reduced their offensive capability in this sector.

Q: Did Russian forces change their tactics during the fighting near Tonenke?

A: Not during the operation proper. They continued to attack with heavy armor. Only later did they shift to lighter platforms and small assault groups.

Q: How did this operation affect the defense of the Pokrovsk sector?

A: It was illustrative of modern defensive warfare. The operation confirmed the effectiveness of combining favorable terrain, advanced technological capabilities, and well-trained personnel. The experience gained there was subsequently used for the continued defense of the Pokrovsk axis.

ON TRAINING COMMANDERS FROM THE NCO CORPS

Q: Has your sense of responsibility for your personnel changed over time?

A: Humanity comes first. A commander has to make tough, decisive calls, but also understand the cost of every order. Human resources are not infinite. I cannot and must not “burn through” people. The foundation is high-quality training, adaptation, and continuous work with instructors. New arrivals go through all stages of training, including at least two weeks of adaptation directly within their units, and only then are they assigned combat tasks.

Q: Are there decisions that are particularly difficult to make?

A: There are lots of them. Every time, you have to weigh whether a mission can be accomplished with the forces at hand while preserving your personnel. A commander’s mistake always carries a very high price.

Q: What kind of commanders does the military need most now?

A: Responsible leaders who are capable of making decisions. There is a severe shortage of personnel, of qualified leaders. That’s why we are actively developing commanders from the NCO corps -- people with combat experience who know how to think independently and take responsibility. Regulations can be learned from manuals, but combat thinking comes only through experience.

“IF THERE IS THE MOTIVATION, WE WILL TRAIN THEM”

Q: What motivates service members the most today?

A: Brotherhood and cohesion. Knowing that you won’t be left behind. There is also a strong sense of responsibility toward the country, to one’s family, and to the oath. Rotations and leave are essential; without them, people simply cannot withstand the psychological strain.

War hardens you, but it can also break you. That’s why it’s crucial to work on motivation, to preserve the brigade’s history and identity, and to understand what—and whom—you are fighting for.

Q: Have there been any stories recently that stood out to you personally?

A: Yes. One of our soldiers single-handedly eliminated the enemy and freed a fellow serviceman from captivity. It was an act of a true warrior. He received a well-deserved award.

Q: What is critically important in training a soldier today?

A: The focus on quality rather than quantity. In performing combat tasks, we cannot afford to “throw people” at the problem. Training centers provide only the basic foundation. Real training begins in the brigade itself, tailored to the specific sector and mission profile.

Each servicemember goes through an adaptation period: seven days under the supervision of brigade instructors, followed by another seven days directly within their unit, working with their NCOs and commanders. Training is designed to be as close as possible to real combat conditions.

Q: Can anyone be taught how to fight?

A: Yes; some need more time, others less. But the decisive factors are motivation and the willingness to grow. If there is the will, we will train them and find the appropriate role.

Q: How does recruiting campaign work in the brigade today?

A: We operate our own recruitment center in Dnipro city, a branded mobile recruiting unit, and a team of specialized instructors. During the warmer months, we operate nationwide. In winter, we base ourselves in schools, lyceums, and academies. We show the brigade from the inside out—training, technologies, medical skills, and real, specific roles.

The key rule is that a person must be assigned to the exact position they came for. If that doesn’t happen, recruitment simply doesn’t work.

Q: Do you also work with foreign volunteers?

A: Yes, that’s a separate line of work—selecting foreign citizens. They go through screening even before basic military training begins and then serve within the brigade under the same conditions as everyone else.

“EVEN AFTER VICTORY, WE WILL BE HOLDING THE BORDERS FOR A LONG TIME”

Q: You are a full recipient of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. What does that mean to you? Which award matters most?

A: It’s not about status; it’s about responsibility—toward those who are still with us, and toward those who didn’t come back.

The most meaningful to me is the First Class Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. It is tied to the Izium operation, when I was already a battalion commander. Leading the forward detachment and ensuring the entire brigade could enter the area safely was an enormous responsibility.

Q: How do you envision the Ukrainian military after victory?

A: Strong and invincible. But even after victory, we will be holding our borders for a long time. The key is not to lose the level of readiness we have achieved and to remember the price of this war.

Q: In your view, will commanders be able to return to civilian life?

A: Yes, provided there is proper support. We operate a veterans’ hub, consistently involve veterans in activities, and do not leave them to face problems alone. The community endures even after the war.

Q: What lesson should Ukrainians learn from this war?

A: Study history. Don’t turn against one another—internal division is the most dangerous threat of all. Ukraine has never knelt and never will.

Serhii Kuzmin led this conversation

Photo via Vitalii Kuzmenko and 25th Separate Sicheslav Airborne Brigade