Bohdan Dronov, Hero of Ukraine

The war as it was in 2022 is a far cry from what it is now in 2025

It is the infantry that holds the front lines, conducts assaults, and knocks the enemy out of their positions. These are the infantry soldiers who are the first to enter the battle and the last to leave the battlefield. Ukrinform won an opportunity to converse with a representative of this branch of the military to get an insight of what is really happening on the most challenging battlefield.

Here, Ukrinform offers you an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bohdan Dronov, commander of the 17th Separate Motorized Infantry Battalion within the 57th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigaded (OMPBr) named after Hetman Kost Hordienko.

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the officer distinguished himself in battles in the Luhansk region. During one of them, not only did he lead the battle, but also personally directed 82-mm mortar fire support onto targets, which was instrumental in destroying a Russian infantry fighting vehicle with about 15 soldiers onboard, as well as a group of enemy forward observers. He sustained a serious wound in April 2022. Now, after long-term treatment and rehabilitation period, Bohdan Dronov serves as a lecturer at the National Defense University of Ukraine.

THE RUSSIANS WERE ASSAULTING US EVEN BEFORE FEBRUARY 24

– Bohdan, could you, please, tell us about the day of February 24, 2022? What was it like for you, when Russia, after eight years of war, launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

– True, according to all accounts, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022. In my sector of the front line, Krymske–Novotoshkivka sector, Luhansk region, that is, in eastern Ukraine, it all happened a little earlier – on February 22.

– Do you mean an escalation of the situation?

– Exactly. Because there had been no battles of this high intensity in this sector for several years in a row before. And then there was a barrage of fire from a BM-21 Grad rocket system, which completely overwhelmed our defenses! Old-timers recalled that a similar situation only occurred once in 2014. Indeed, this came as a surprise to us all at the time. And then the Russian infantry moved in, and Katsap (Russian) tanks began to drive en masse toward the front line. Then they burned massively, but that happened later on. But then, on February 22, 2022, before Putin announced the so-called Special Military Operation (SVO), the enemy began to explicitly demonstrate its intentions for a full-fledged offensive.

I remember that at that time we reacted to this mindfully. Our confidence was based on the fact that we had been preparing our defenses for a long time, and we were ready for surprises. After all, we were well entrenched, the contact line in front of us was fenced with a mine barrier, and there was enough ammunition for a week of fighting without the need for re-supply. And we were also well stocked with food and water supplies. Proverbially, everything was enough for life and for fighting!

I emphasize it again that by February 24, the Russians had already carried out several assaults, pounded our positions, seeking to advance through the disputed territory called “Zholobok”. Anyone who served in the area of the 29th checkpoint knows this place well…

– Was it a gray zone?

– Oh, yes. No one could capture this Zholobok then, neither the Russians nor we. It was a kind of death sentence! It is worth remembering that before the war with Russia there was a namesake settlement, and by February 24, 2022, not a stone had been left there! Massed artillery shelling turned it into a real desert! It’s a perfect, excuse me, illustration of what the “Russian world” brought to us!

And so, before the full-scale invasion, the Russians made several attempts to wedge into our positions. However, these were our old defensive lines, well-equipped and prepared, so they could only be bypassed, but the enemy was unable to pass them by...

So, on February 24, 2022, I was resting when my chief of staff, the first deputy commander of the unit with the call sign “February,” woke me up and said that Vladimir Putin had declared war on Ukraine. I don’t remember what time of the day it happened, but I remember that it was dark outside. And I also remember well how I reacted! You could understand my emotions, because I went to bed quite late and I was feeling really sleepy. Therefore, the chief of staff, having caught me in the heat of the moment, heard everything I thought about him! However, he explained to me the reason for such an early rise. He told me that Putin had made a video address in which he declared his ephemeral “SVO.”

– What happened next?

– I immediately brought together my deputies and said that no matter how deep dug in we were, no matter how many rounds of ammunition we had, the enemy is cunning and insidious, it would ultimately figure out how to smoke us out of here. I invited company leaders to attend the meeting, where I spread out a map on the table and outlined the tasks to be undertaken by each unit. I explained how they should act even if I suddenly disappeared. I will say frankly that at the February 24, 2022 meeting, we explored the full set of various hypothetical or possible future situations.

– How did the aggressors act?

– The enemy turned out to be really smart and managed to bypassed out positions. The threat of encirclement was looming over our and the neighboring battalion of the 57th Brigade, so the commanders ordered the battalion to withdraw to other lines. We had less than an hour, even less than 40 minutes, to prepare for redeployment. And this, I remind you, involved more than three hundred personnel. We had to act quickly and in a well-organized manner…

And here I was faced with the problem of gathering personnel. I had to personally convince the battalion’s soldiers that due to the lack of time we had to act quickly and take with us, first of all, machine guns, ammunition, collective weapons, and not, excuse me, various household items. Having left the dugout “stuff” and taken weapons and ammunition with us, we withdrew. I managed to lead the battalion towards the settlement of Svitlychne in the Luhansk Region’s Dovzhansky District. Once there, we took up a defense line in the Svitlychne–Novotoshkivka sector. This was the line where the battalion encountered the enemy.

By the way, while leaving for new positions, I remembered that there was a unit in the brigade with which we had previously lost contact. Since this unit was located deep in the forest, I decided to send my officer to warn it about our withdrawal to new positions. In this way, I warned the commander of the neighboring unit that if the withdrawal was not carried out, it would be left cut off from the Brigade’s core forces, left alone with the enemy.

– So, you scared them?

– What else was I left to do? After my officer, who was acting as a liaison delegate, explained the potential consequences of their untimely withdrawal, a representative of that unit arrived at my place, and we discussed all the details of the redeployment operation and temporary subordination. I must say that they did not have to be persuaded much. Within fifteen minutes, this unit arrived at my battalion’s positions and stayed there until stable communication with its command headquarters was restored.

– So, this is how a kind of “captain Dronov’s combined detachment” was formed.

– Afterwards, the officers and soldiers from this unit thanked me for the decision to put them under my command and withdraw them from that deep forest where there was no communication. After all, it is quite likely that if it were not for this decision then, in February 2024, they would have remained uninformed, and who knows what would have happened to them! Just imagine staying in the forest, cut off from the outside world, and this is under conditions where the enemy had suppressed all mobile communication lines, and neighboring units had withdrawn to new lines. The satellite internet system Starlink did not exist yet. And all communication was carried out using regular mobile communication networks…

WE DID NOT SURRENDER A METER OF OUR LAND TO THE ENEMY

– You said that you had to withdraw to a new line of defense. Was it equipped enough for defense?

– No, it was not! I had to use my experience as company commander. I explained my formula to every soldier, every squad commander, every platoon commander, literally: “You dig here, you shoot here!” Then I encountered certain difficulties furnishing the positions. The prime challenge was to handle the lack of time. That is what I told the battalion’s personnel: “You have only two hours to prepare, or rather, to dig in, because the enemy will not allow us more time!”

And so it happened. Immediately after we had driven to the designated positions, or rather, the places where they were supposed to be located, and began digging in, the enemy, within an hour, literally, began firing at us from helicopters, airplanes and artillery! Indeed, this did not add to our optimism, since we did not have time to properly prepare. True, at that time, we were subject only to air strikes and artillery shelling, while the enemy was yet to deploy its motorized rifle and infantry assaults.

My line of defense, or zone of responsibility was broadly divided into three sectors nicknamed Vodokachka, Millionnyk, and Novotoshkivka. These were a kind of defense areas that controlled everything. Fortunately, I had intelligent company commanders who could control these zones at their assigned levels. Thanks to the commander’s ingenuity, the personnel’s courage and perseverance, we held the areas. We did not surrender even a single meter of land to the enemy.

THE RUSSIANS OUTNUMBERED US, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF PERSONNEL, BY A FACTOR OF UP TO TWELVE

- How much personnel and equipment was the enemy using against your sector of defense?

- The Russians outnumbered us by a factor of up to twelve, especially in terms of personnel. And they, I emphasize it, used this against our poorly equipped positions, and we didn’t have enough ammunition in stock, not even considering the intensity of enemy shelling attacks! The Russians were firing at our positions with everything available to them. We, for our part, were fighting back with what was available to us at that time. And fortunately, the commander of the Agat Brigade helped us with everything the unit had then. But the enemy, however, enjoined a massive superiority in firepower over us, and took full advantage of it. The Russians blanketed our defensive line with relentless fire, plowing it over with bombs, artillery shells and mortar rounds!

It was then when we learned to operate the DJI Mavic 3T quadcopters, which we used for artillery spotting roles. Before that, there had never been such a massive use of Mavic drones in my memory. And then, during the full-scale invasion, we simply kissed that Mavic! Unfortunately, we had too few of them to successfully track down the enemy’s maneuvers. I had only two DJI Mavic 3T quadcopters available to my battalion. Therefore, they worked until they were completely exhausted. Having taken off into the sky and having used up all the available resource, that is, having run out of power, our Mavic returned to the ground. We quickly inserted a new battery into it, and it took off again to monitor the movements of occupying forces. And so on throughout the day and night. This helped us a lot at that time…

LATER ON, WE ENOUNTERED LOTS OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS’ BODIES IN THE RIVER AND ON ITS BANK WITHOUT SIGNS OF LIFE

– What other challenges did your unit have to face?

– The problem was that we were surrounded on three sides. Why do I say surrounded? Because the enemy was behind us. The only saving factor was that the Seversky Donets River separated us from the Russians. However, thank God, the strong current prevented them from crossing over to our side.

The occupiers tried their best to cross over the river, using makeshift boats for this, but all attempts ended up fatally for them. The fast current and underwater rocks made it impossible for the enemy to reach the opposite bank. The Russian boats could not withstand the encounter with the rocks and the turbulent current of the Seversky Donets. Later on, we found bodies of lots of Russian soldiers in the river and on its banks with no signs of life. Of course, I set up observation posts to monitor the enemy's actions, but they only noted its unsuccessful attempts to seize a bridgehead on our side of the river. However, the aggressor was firing at my strongpoint from three sides.

In addition to the personnel who suffered from enemy shelling attacks, our equipment, in particular vehicles, which were an important means of transportation, were also being incapacitated.  Due to the continuous shelling of the area, we were unable to properly protect our motor transport. And the entire territory was littered with shrapnel, which primarily damaged the rubber tires of our vehicles. We laughed at the fact that the hundred thousand hryvnias that we were paid for being in the combat zone went to buy new tires. This is a response to those smart people who like counting money in other people's pockets. So frequently and intensively the tires had been punctured, that we simply did not have time to replace them with new ones...

- Bohdan, given the long time the war is grinding on, could you assess who is better prepared for combat operations, the Russian military that invaded in February 2022 or the current one, which continues to pressure us on every sector of the front line?

- The current one is definitely the one that is prepared better.

ONLY THOSE WHO BOLDLY EXPERIMENT, USING NOT ONLY MODERN WEAPONS, BUT ALSO NEW TACTICAL METHODS, ARE VICTORIOUS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

– Is that because it has been in battles and gained relevant experience?

– Let’s say it thus: better trained fighters are valued more than soldiers with battlefield experience. It’s just that their commanders are cruel and intelligent both at the same time. It must be admitted that Russian commanders adapt and learn quickly. Uninitiated people or a kind of armchair pundits can be sometimes heard saying, “Those Russians are not a big deal! They act primitively, using the tactics of “meat grinder assaults,” and this causes them huge losses, primarily in manpower. So, one should have no fear of them”. I confirm this, yes, they use “meat grinder” tactic, and I also confirm that they suffer huge losses.

It's true that people are expendable material for the Russian war command. But we must admit that they also win a lot from it. They use quite pragmatically this significant human resource of theirs, strange and cynical as it may sound. By throwing personnel into so-called meat grinder assaults, the Russians thus reveal the location of our firing points. They quickly adapt to new challenges and, unfortunately, have learned to read our tactic. Yes, to read it and predict. During the war, they compiled multiple manuals dedicated to our tactics. They analyze every attack of ours or even minor assault to the smallest detail, and then describe them in their manuals and instructions, in order to later use them on the battlefield.

We as well have to learn a lot, from the enemy in particular. As a Ukrainian general once said, “Study your enemy and learn from it.” War implies continuous experimentation, or, if you will, improvisation. After all, only those are victorious on the battlefield who boldly experiment, using not only modern weapons but also new tactic.

– So, we have come to the conclusion that the war as it was in 2022 is a far cry from what it is now in 2025…

– Very far cry.

– You said that “Russian commanders are cruel and intelligent both at the same time”. Could you elaborate, please?

– We, being military servicemen, must, above all else, operate not with emotions, but with cold calculation. I maintain that Russian tactical-level officers are worthy enemies, albeit not in the sense of noble virtues and chivalry, but in a professional sense. I reiterate it once again that Russian commanders are cruel and intelligent both at the same time. First of all, because, having enough requisite resources, they can figure out how to organize defense and how to attack, depending on the available situation. This was explicitly seen at least from how the adversary organized a multi-layered defense in southern Ukraine, which allowed the Russians to reliably hold their positions. And even if we broke through the first line of defense, the second line was already on guard, simply gunning us down, forcing us to withdraw even from the positions we captured previously. That is, we had absolutely no chance of gaining a foothold and holding our defense lines for a long time.

We used to be convinced more than once that the Russians must not be underestimated. In particular, during our offensive actions, the enemy often resorted to mining its trenches, laying TNT mining traps in camouflaged hideouts. After our servicemen entered the abandoned positions, the Russians simply blew them up.

– Remotely?

– That's right. Just a hundred meters from the trench, their soldier sat and waited for our servicemen to enter it. And then he set off an explosive device, obliterating our highly skilled fighters without a fight...

THE CURRENT WAR IS NOT A WAR OF HUMAN BEINGS, BUT A TECHNOLOGICAL WAR THAT REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE AND A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF STATE-OF-THE-ART TECHNOLOGIES

– This begs a question: “How to defeat the Russian army?” What do you as an infantry battalion commander think of this?

– Defeat it with ingenuity! With ingenuity and logic, and it is crucial to have in reserve alternative means of counteraction against the enemy. After all, this is not a war of human beings. This is a technological war that requires knowledge and a sufficient amount of cutting-edge technologies. A modern battalion or company leader should have plenty of such technologies available to him. I will say something, perhaps cynical, but human resources have to be used in a more thrifty manner during combat operations. Since you cannot redeploy to a new position now, you will have difficulty conducting a rotation of personnel. It is difficult to change even three people, and even more so to conduct a large-scale rotation. Hence the challenge of providing frontline soldiers with food, ammunition, and everything else necessary for survival.

Incidentally, this can all be delivered with drones. Multiple units currently use them for this role. The evacuation of wounded casualties from the battlefield remains an important challenge. You can’t get them out with a drone. Individual brigades currently use robotic platforms for evacuation of the wounded. They put the wounded soldiers in a safe place and, using such remotely controlled platforms, bring them through dangerous areas…

– But this depends on the terrain being travelled...

– Yes, of course, this is possible where the terrain allows it. But I will tell you that everything can be adapted to successfully. In any case, it is much safer than having two personnel to carry a wounded patient out of positions on a stretcher. After all, this would make them into a convenient group target. And for the enemy, this is an advantageous target, because there is not one fighter in an open area, but three at once. Excuse me, but however cynical it may sound, it is not a problem for an FPV drone to catch up with human beings.

– At one time, Ukrainians pinned great hopes on advanced foreign-suppled weapons, in particular, U.S.-supplied Abrams tanks and German-supplied Leopard tanks. Why do you think these hopes not come true?

– In my humble opinion as an infantry battalion commander, the cause behind the lack of the desired result is hidden primarily in the amount of equipment. It is, frankly, insufficient. With a small amount of weapons available, even the most technological ones, we will not achieve any significant success on the battlefield. If we have thirty tanks, what will they change?

For example, you have thirty missiles. What can they change on the battlefield? Yes, they will inflict losses on the enemy, but, you must admit, these losses will not be critical. Can this number of missiles turn the table of the war? Definitely not! When there is thirty thousand of them, this will be another story altogether. The same goes for tanks.

– A different effect…

– Yes, indeed. A much larger number of tanks is needed to achieve strategic objectives. After all, thirty Abrams tanks will only be enough to conduct an operation in one particular sector of the front line. Take, for example, the American Bradley M-2 infantry fighting vehicle. This is a wonderful machine. I used to talk to officers who had experience fighting on this vehicle. They were amazed with it. But we have far too few of them. These vehicles in our arsenal are numbered in the ones or twos, not in the dozens, let alone the hundreds. They are not massively deployed on the battlefield, and therefore cannot have a significant impact on the frontline situation.

Paradoxically, there is another challenge that needs to be addressed. It so happened that we now possess almost all the weapons that exist in the world, including the most technologically sophisticated modifications. Moreover, we possess them in quantities that are even hard to imagine. One brigade can accumulate so many different foreign technologies that you just don’t have time to gain experience with this variety in its entirety. And don’t forget, you need to train personnel to use them all.

When serving as chief of combat training at the Brigade, I had to spend nights figuring out how to use all this weaponry that came to us from foreign partners. I myself mastered new samples in order to then train the personnel to use them.

– At least to get to known their performance capabilities…

– Yes, at least the performance capabilities. By the way, physical and performance characteristics is a separate story to tell, because individual foreign manufacturers did not even provide us with relevant manuals and specifications, or they were not entirely accurate. Therefore, we had to study and test the samples in detail in order to understand not only the principle of operation, but also the characteristics proper.

Now we have the opportunity to contact weapons manufacturers by phone to get consulted on the operation of the technologies supplied. The widespread use of foreign-supplied weapons has also facilitated us in expanding our communications with other brigades that have similar technologies in service.

THE ENEMY HAS NOW SWITCHED OVER TO MIXED ATTACKS, USING FPV DRONE RAIDS SUPPORTED WITH ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS

- Infantry on the battlefield typically operates with close support from artillery. How effective, in your opinion, is this cooperation? After all, it was not only due to the number of artillery guns that Russian forces used to dominate the battlefield for quite long, but also due to their superiority in terms of ammunition supply. Has this imbalance in the amount of means of destruction used by the enemy and our defense forces and, most importantly, in the effectiveness of their use, been leveled?

– In terms of a criterion such as the effectiveness of use, then, in my opinion, we are definitely superior in terms of the effectiveness of artillery use. Our is more accurate. But it is also worthwhile to admit that we are inferior in the amount of ammunition. Therefore, our artillery, due to problems with ammunition logistics, often remains on a “hunger ration”. In 2022, that is, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, literally thousands of hits were recorded in small areas in some individual locations. In other words, our positions resembled a kind of lunar landscape, with numerous craters from exploded shells. The number of artillery hits are seemingly decreasing more now, because the Russians too have less ammunition available to them. This made them switch over to mixed attacks, using FPV drone raids supported with artillery bombardments.

Our gunners, I reiterate this again, are trying to focus primarily on the thrifty consumption of ammunition and improving the accuracy of target hits. As for the enemy’s artillery, it is gradually losing its relevance. In my opinion, it used to have a significant impact on the course of hostilities in 2022 and even in early 2023. In 2024, if I may say so, artillery, both Ukrainian and Russian, has lost its hegemony, having ceased to be the driving force on the battlefield it used to be at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Now it is FPV drones that dominate the battlefield, or rather, the airspace over it…

– We often laugh at videos showing Russian soldiers conducting offensive actions in small groups. They sometimes use very unusual means of transportation such as bicycles, electric scooters, motor scooters, civilian cars, and sometimes even exotic, for a 21st century war, domestic animals... What can you say about the tactics of small groups? What are its pros and cons?

– The strong side to this tactic is that it works! The proof of this is that the enemy, despite all the odds, is advancing! This tactic is also advantageous in that it gives Russian assaulting forces the opportunity to reveal and record the location of our firing positions, providing they have observation and surveillance equipment, and believe me, they do have it! They, just like us, have unmanned aerial vehicles in large numbers, which they employ both for roles of reconnaissance and air strikes...

– It is worth reminding that the enemy is using a tactic from the Second World War, when the Red Army conducted battlefield reconnaissance in this way to detect the locations of Wehrmacht's firing positions.

– Yes, undoubtedly, that’s right!

– And the third or fourth waves of the enemy offensive then complete the job after eliminating our firing points that were holding back Russian advances…

– After eliminating or suppressing them, to be more precise. Because it is one and the same, since a firing point on the battlefield is not so easy to eliminate, even with an FPV drone attack, because there are electronic warfare countermeasures that are very effective in suppressing controls of hostile unmanned aerial vehicles.

Regarding battlefield reconnaissance, which you mentioned, you couldn’t say it more accurately. This is exactly the tactic that our enemy uses. The Russians, even in modern manuals and instructions, state that an assault will always start with reconnaissance by fire to detect the locations of enemy’s firing positions, and only then weapon-fire assets come into action. That is, reconnaissance as such is of lesser relevance for them…

– But this tactic, however, is only effective if supported by a sufficient amount of manpower? Is that so, in your opinion?

– Believe me, they are all right with manpower. The Russians have constant replenishments of personnel. It is a kind of conveyor. It is not the same for us…

– How well do you think these fresh soldiers are prepared for offensive operations?

– The first wave is unprepared at all! They are not even provided with appropriate weapons, according to our observations. Yes, they do have some elementary individual protective equipment, such as helmets, body armor, elbow pads, and knee pads, which they most likely purchased at their own expense. But in some locations, they really lack weapons. They are often sent into attacks unprovided even with unsophisticated automatic rifles. They go just to fall somewhere after taking hits from our defeat means. The following waves are better prepared, they already know how to act. They are better equipped, have more means for entrenchment, that is, they are going into attacks already provided with small sapper shovels. They are ready to fall onto the ground and dig in at the first threat. The first wave is not ready for a real battle. They are simply going to set fire to themselves. These are the ones who are not to be felt sorry for...

- Okay, it’s clear with the infantry, but under what circumstances do the Russians use their equipment? Tanks, IFVs, APCs, MT-LBs?

- I will not tell you that! The Russians seem to tend resorting to armored assaults where they have unreliable intelligence. That is, where they think that the terrain in front of them, a field or a road are free from landmines, and there are no anti-tank weapons deployed on our positions. It is then when they probably launch their vehicles. But war is so changeable and dynamic now that you can expect anything on the battlefield. Where it was safe yesterday can be deadly tomorrow!

Our Brigade has the capacity to lay over a hundred anti-tank mines overnight in the likely direction of enemy’s assault. Yes, the mines are not there in the evening, but are there just the next morning! And this, I emphasize it, is done without involving personnel, so as not to expose people to danger.

The battle of Vuhledar is highly illustrative. Sometimes it is even difficult to count how much pieces of equipment the enemy has lost there! …

Olexandr Fil, Mykola Zoryk, Kyiv

Photo via Bohdan Dronov’s personal archive